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PROBABILITY AND PUNISHMENT:
HOW TO IMPROVE SENTENCING
BY TAKING ACCOUNT OF PROBABILITY
Jacob Schuman*

The United States Sentencing Guidelines place little emphasis on probability.
Instead, the Guidelines recommend a sentence in each case based only on
whether certain facts about the offender’s crime exceed a ‘‘threshold’’ level of
likelihood. Guidelines sentences therefore fail to reﬂect the precise odds of each
defendant’s wrongdoing, which makes them both inefﬁcient and unfair. This
model of decision making is particularly problematic in drug sentencing, where
judges often impose lengthy sentences based on drug quantity calculations that
carry a high risk of error. To address these problems, district courts should exercise
their discretion, and policymakers should implement reforms that incorporate
probability into punishment.
Keywords: criminal law, criminal procedure, sentencing, drugs, quantity,
probability
INTRODUCTION

Imagine two defendants, A and B, who have each been convicted of drug
trafﬁcking. Defendant A was caught with 1000 grams of crack cocaine.
Defendant B was caught with only 100 grams of crack cocaine, but he also
had a large sum of cash, which he probably—though not certainly—earned
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by selling an additional 900 grams of crack just before his arrest. When the
time comes for sentencing, should A and B receive the same punishment?
The federal criminal justice system says that they should.1 This Article
will argue that they should not. The probability that A trafﬁcked 1000
grams of drugs is higher than the probability that B did, so B deserves the
lighter sentence.
Calls for sentencing reform—especially drug sentencing reform—are
growing louder. One so-far overlooked way to improve the efﬁciency and
fairness of the criminal justice system is to vary punishments based on the
probability of the underlying facts. Although probability estimations regarding past events are fundamental to the administration of criminal justice, no
scholar has ever examined the role that probability plays in sentencing, nor
has anyone ever explored how decision makers in the justice system can
account for their level of certainty when they impose punishment.
The United States Sentencing Commission, for example, recently
sought comment on a proposal to make drug sentencing less punitive by
reducing the recommended sentences associated with trafﬁcking various
quantities of drugs.2 This Article will show that, beyond simply reducing
all prison sentences for drug offenders, drug sentences could be made
shorter, fairer, and more efﬁcient by varying the punishment imposed
based on the probability that the offender trafﬁcked a particular quantity
of drugs. This is a reform, moreover, that district courts can already begin
to implement using their sentencing discretion,3 while policymakers consider more systemic changes, several of which are suggested later on below.4
1. Compare United States v. Lucas, 282 F.3d 414, 417–18 (6th Cir. 2002), overruled on
other grounds by United States v. Leachman, 309 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 2002) (defendant caught
with 595.8 grams of crack-cocaine received 210-month sentence), with United States v.
Gardner, 417 F.3d 541, 543 (6th Cir. 2005) (defendant caught with 72 grams of crackcocaine and $16,000 cash, believed to represent proceeds from sale of an additional
598.74 grams of crack-cocaine, received 210 month sentence). In both cases, the defendants’
sentences were also enhanced for their possession of ﬁrearms. See Gardner, 417 F.3d at 543;
Lucas, 282 F.3d at 418.
2. See U.S. Sentencing Commission, News Release: U.S. Sentencing Commission Seeks
Comment on Potential Reduction to Drug Trafﬁcking Sentences 1, http://www.ussc.gov/
sites/default/ﬁles/pdf/news/press-releases-and-news-advisories/press-releases/20140109_
Press_Release.pdf. This is a rather dramatic oversimpliﬁcation of the reform proposed by
the Commission, which is explored in greater detail below. See infra, Part VI.C.3.
3. See infra Part VI.B.
4. See infra Part VI.C.
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There is a special relationship between probability and punishment
because the criminal justice system is inherently fallible. A trial can never
determine with absolute certainty that an accused defendant committed
a particular crime—some margin of doubt will always remain. To render
judgment, therefore, the criminal law must estimate the probability that
each defendant is guilty of the offense charged and then translate that
probability into speciﬁc penal consequences.
As this Article will explain, there is more than one way to translate
probability into punishment. The guilt stage of criminal proceedings—the
criminal trial—places little emphasis on probability. Trials use a ‘‘threshold
model’’ of decision making, in which the prosecution convicts the defendant by establishing that the likelihood that he committed the crime
charged exceeds a certain ‘‘threshold’’ level of probability. If the jury believes that it is ‘‘beyond a reasonable doubt’’ that the defendant did the
deed—a level of proof typically quantiﬁed as 95 percent probability—it will
return a guilty verdict. If not, then the defendant will walk free. Neither
outcome will reﬂect a precise measure of the odds of the defendant’s guilt.
The threshold model of conviction is so basic to American criminal
justice that it may seem inevitable. But in fact, there is another way to
translate probability estimations into punishment: a ‘‘probabilistic model’’
of decision making. The probabilistic model places far more emphasis on
probability, directly incorporating it into legal outcomes. A probabilistic
model of conviction, for example, would vary the outcome of each trial
based on the probability of the defendant’s guilt. If the defendant were
more likely to be guilty, he would receive a harsher verdict; if he were less
likely, he would get a lighter one; and if he were almost certainly innocent,
he would be exonerated.
This Article begins with the as-yet unappreciated observation that the
penalty stage of criminal proceedings—the sentencing hearing—also uses
a ‘‘threshold model’’ of decision making that largely ignores probability.
The United States Sentencing Guidelines instruct federal district judges to
make a series of factual ﬁndings related to the offender and his offense,
which either add to or subtract from an ultimate recommended sentence.
Just like with the threshold model of conviction, a sentencing judge determines the applicability of these sentence adjustments by deciding
whether it is ‘‘more likely than not’’—more than 50 percent likely—that
the factual predicate for an adjustment has been fulﬁlled. If it is, then that
adjustment will apply in full. Otherwise, it will not. Once again, neither
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outcome will reﬂect the actual probability that the sentence adjustment is
appropriate.
This Article then breaks new ground by demonstrating that the justiﬁcations for the threshold model of conviction do not hold up at sentencing.
Moreover, the two ﬂaws identiﬁed with the threshold model of conviction—inefﬁciency and unfairness—are not only present at sentencing, but
in fact are exacerbated by several unique features of this stage of the
proceedings.
Finally, this Article applies these insights to drug sentencing, and demonstrates that the threshold model of sentencing is especially problematic
when it comes to determinations of drug quantity. Under the Sentencing
Guidelines, drug offenders receive longer sentences if they trafﬁcked in
larger quantities of contraband. But district judges often must rely on
extrapolation and inference to make such ﬁndings. As a result, courts
frequently mete out lengthy prison terms based on quantity determinations
that carry a high risk of error. This Article will argue that courts and
policymakers should mitigate the inefﬁciencies and injustices that result
from these fact-ﬁndings by incorporating probability into drug quantity
determinations at sentencing.

I. THE THRESHOLD MODEL OF CONVICTION

This Part will show that a criminal trial can never determine with absolute
certainty whether a particular defendant committed a particular crime,
which means judges and juries can only estimate the probability of a defendant’s guilt when they render judgment upon him. There are two ways
that scholars have identiﬁed to translate these probability estimations into
trial outcomes. The ‘‘threshold’’ model turns on a single probability
threshold, whereas the ‘‘probabilistic’’ model incorporates many levels
of probability. Federal criminal trials, for example, use a threshold model
of conviction: the jury or judge will convict the defendant if the probability that he committed the crime charged is ‘‘beyond a reasonable
doubt.’’ This burden of proof is typically quantiﬁed as 95 percent likelihood of guilt. As an alternative to the threshold approach, scholars have
proposed a probabilistic model of conviction that would use multiple trial
outcomes to more precisely approximate the probability of the defendant’s guilt.
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A. Threshold and Probabilistic Models of Decision Making
1. The Impossibility of Absolute Certainty

‘‘Certainty, absolute certainty, is a satisfaction which . . . we are continually
grasping at,’’ lamented Jeremy Bentham in his Rationale of Judicial Evidence,
‘‘but which the inexorable nature of things has placed forever out of reach.’’5
Over two centuries later, ‘‘absolute certainty’’ remains outside the grasp of the
criminal law. No judge or jury can ever know with absolute certainty that
a defendant committed the criminal act of which he is accused. A specter of
doubt haunts every verdict, even if it is an unreasonable, or a fantastical, doubt.
No matter how strong the prosecution’s evidence, a clever criminal
defense attorney can always ﬁnd cracks in the case against his client.
Imagine, for example, that Brutus is on trial for murdering Caesar. The
prosecution might offer the testimony of two eyewitnesses who say that
Brutus did the deed. Yet Brutus’ lawyer, in response, can argue that both
witnesses have misremembered and mistaken his client for the real killer.
Perhaps the government will present DNA evidence linking Brutus to the
crime scene. Yet there is also the chance that the blood samples were
accidentally switched in the lab. Maybe the police even physically arrested
Brutus at the scene of the crime, knife in hand. Still, at trial, his attorney
might argue that Brutus had been framed by law enforcement.6
In short, whenever the prosecution argues that the evidence before the
court reﬂects a certain narrative about the past, the defendant can always
present a counter-narrative—an alternative possible story. That alternative
may be quite implausible, but it will always enjoy some degree of likelihood, no matter how slim.
2. Two Ways to Translate Practical Certainty

Even though absolute certainty is unattainable in the courtroom, legal factﬁnders can still approach the bounds of 100 percent conﬁdence in their
5. 5 J EREMY B ENTHAM , R ATIONALE OF J UDICIAL E VIDENCE 351 (J.S. Mill ed. 1827).
6. Professor Eugene Volokh makes a similar version of this argument when he speculates
that in criminal cases involving a ‘‘word against word situation,’’ the ‘‘omnipresent’’ risk that
the prosecution’s witness is lying may actually make fact-ﬁnders more likely to convict.
Eugene Volokh, Wrongful Convictions and Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt, T HE V OLOKH
C O N S P I R A C Y (Jan. 2, 2014; 1:11 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2014/01/02/wrongfulconvictions-proof-beyond-reasonable-doubt/.
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conclusions. In other words, although a judge can never know that a fact
about the past is 100 percent likely to be true, she can estimate that it is 51
percent likely to be true, or 95 percent likely, or maybe even 99 percent
likely.7 Indeed, the legal system has codiﬁed certain levels of probability as
standards of proof: ‘‘proof by a preponderance of the evidence’’ is just over
50 percent probability of truth, ‘‘proof by clear and convincing evidence’’ is
roughly equal to 70 percent probability of truth, and ‘‘proof beyond a reasonable doubt’’ is commonly quantiﬁed as 95 percent probability of
truth.8 This is the ‘‘[p]ractical certainty’’ in which Bentham sought solace,
‘‘a degree of assurance sufﬁcient for practice . . . the attainment of
which . . . may be sufﬁcient to console us under the want of any . . . superﬂuous and unattainable acquisitions.’’9
The impossibility of absolute certainty raises a fundamental question of
legal epistemology: When a judgment turns on a speciﬁc fact about the
past, how should the justice system translate the probability of that fact’s
truth into legal consequences? In other words, how likely must it be that
Brutus killed Caesar in order for the criminal justice system to hold him
responsible for the crime? And what relevance should that probability
judgment have for the severity of the punishment he receives?
Scholars have identiﬁed two possible answers to these questions: the
threshold model of decision-making and the probabilistic model of decision-making.10 What follows is a brief, general explanation of how these
models work in theory. It will help inform the more concrete discussion of
how they work at trial and at sentencing later on.

7. See J OHN M. M AGUIRE ET AL ., C ASES AND M ATERIALS ON E VIDENCE 1 (6th ed.
1973).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 403–6 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (Weinstein,
J.). The conversion of standards of proof into levels of probability is sometimes controversial; for more on the quantiﬁcation of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt and preponderance-of-the-evidence standards, see infra notes 14 and 35.
9. B ENTHAM , supra note 5, at 351.
10. See, e.g., Edward K. Cheng, Reconceptualizing the Burden of Proof, 122 Y ALE L.J. 1254
(2013); Talia Fisher, Conviction Without Conviction, 96 M INN . L. R EV . 833, 834–35 (2012);
Neil B. Cohen, Conﬁdence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World of Imperfect
Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U. L. R EV . 385, 398–404 (1985); Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the
Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 H ARV . L. R EV . 1357, 1361–62
(1985); Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84
H ARV . L. R EV . 1329 (1971).
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According to the threshold model of decision-making, only one threshold level of probability matters. A court using the threshold model decides
that a fact about the past is either true or untrue based on whether the
probability of its truth exceeds a speciﬁc level of likelihood. If the probability does exceed that speciﬁc threshold level, then the court will declare
the fact true. The court will then apply all the legal consequences for the
truth of that fact. If the probability does not cross the threshold, then the
court will decide that the fact is untrue, and no consequences will follow.
The threshold model is therefore ‘‘all-or-nothing.’’11 It declares facts about
the past to be either true or not true, and the consequences for those facts
either apply in full or not at all.
By contrast, the probabilistic model of decision-making incorporates the
probability of a fact’s truth into the application of its legal consequences.
Under the probabilistic model, the court estimates the odds of a fact’s truth
across an open range of probabilities. The court then imposes legal consequences in proportion to the probability that the fact is true. As the
probability of the fact’s truth increases, the consequences applied will also
increase. As the probability decreases, so too will the consequences.
The probabilistic model therefore never deﬁnitively decides one way or
the other whether a fact about the past is ‘‘true’’ or ‘‘untrue.’’ Instead, the
probability that a fact is true determines the magnitude of its legal
consequences.
B. Threshold and Probabilistic Models of Conviction
1. The Threshold Model of Conviction

Federal criminal trials use a threshold model of decision making. Outcomes
are limited to two verdicts: guilty or not guilty.12 The presumption of
innocence sets the default outcome at not guilty, but that will switch to
guilty if the prosecution persuades a jury that it is ‘‘beyond a reasonable
doubt’’ that the defendant committed the crime charged.13 This burden of
11. Fisher, supra note 10, at 834–35.
12. See Samuel Bray, Not Proven: Introducing a Third Verdict, 72 U. C HI . L. R EV . 1299,
1299 (2005). There are a few exceptions on the margins, such as ‘‘not guilty by reason of
insanity,’’ but by and large the standard criminal case is limited to the guilty/not guilty
binary. See id. at 1299 n.4.
13. See United States v. Haudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364
(1970).
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proof is, in essence, a threshold level of probability, usually quantiﬁed as
95 percent likelihood that the defendant did the deed.14 Proof above or below
that speciﬁc degree of certainty is irrelevant. If the odds that the defendant is
guilty exceed the 95 percent threshold of probability, then he will be convicted. If 94 percent or less, then he will be ‘‘categorically acquitted.’’15
Criminal liability under the threshold model of conviction is ‘‘all-ornothing.’’16 Once the case against the defendant crosses the threshold level
of certainty, the defendant will receive the same conviction as any other
offender who committed the same crime, although in some cases the
prosecution will have had a slam-dunk case (100% certainty of guilt) and
in others it will have just barely outstripped any reasonable doubts (95%
certainty of guilt). And conversely, if the government does not meet its
burden of proof, then the offender will not suffer any legal consequences at
all, no matter whether his innocence was obvious (0% certainty of guilt), or
only the narrowest sliver of a reasonable doubt remained (94% certainty of
guilt).
2. The Probabilistic Model of Conviction

The threshold model of conviction is fundamental to American criminal
justice,17 but it is not the only option. Michel Foucault has shown, for
example, that culpability in medieval European law ran along a spectrum.
Under the Ancien Régime, ‘‘partial[] punish[ment]’’ could be imposed on
a defendant based on partial suspicion:
The different pieces of evidence did not constitute so many neutral elements, until such time as they could be gathered together into a single body
of evidence that would bring the ﬁnal certainty of guilt. Each piece of evidence aroused a particular degree of abomination . . . Thus a semi-proof did
not leave the suspect innocent until such time as it was completed; it made
him semi-guilty . . . In short, penal demonstration did not obey a dualistic
14. See, e.g., David Kaye, Laws of Probability and the Law of the Land, 47 U. C HI . L.
R EV . 34, 40 (1979). There is some disagreement over the 95% ﬁgure. See, e.g., United States
v. Fatico, 458 F.Supp. 388, 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (Weinstein, J); Laurence H. Tribe, An
Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in the World of John Mitchell, 56 V A . L. R EV . 371, 388
(1970). This Article, however, does not hang on that quantiﬁcation, which is merely offered
as convenient shorthand for ‘‘some very high level of probability below 100%.’’
15. Fisher, supra note 10, at 834–35.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 835.
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system: true or false; but a principal of continuous gradation; a degree
reached in the demonstration formed a degree of guilt and consequently
involved a degree of punishment.18

Times have long since changed, but several scholars have called for a return
to a nonbinary system for criminal verdicts that would account for the
probability judgments that underlie every decision to convict or acquit.19
A probabilistic model of conviction20 would differ from the threshold
model by incorporating the probability of the defendant’s guilt into the
outcome of each trial. This approach would add a number of new verdicts
to the jury’s arsenal that would represent waypoints along the probability
spectrum—for example, ‘‘not proven,’’21 ‘‘blameless violation,’’22 ‘‘guilty,
but not punishable,’’23 or ‘‘innocent’’24—so that the jury could more
precisely express its estimation of the likelihood that the defendant committed the crime charged. Later, at the penalty stage of the proceedings,
these new verdicts would help determine the severity of the defendant’s
punishment.25 Punishment would increase as the jury’s conﬁdence in the
defendant’s guilt rose, and fall as the jury’s level of certainty fell. At very low
levels of probable guilt, the jury might ofﬁcially exonerate the accused by
expressing a total lack of conﬁdence in his culpability.26 One scholar has
even suggested a return to the medieval model, in which partial punishments would attach to partway levels of guilt,27 though that would almost
18. M ICHEL F OUCAULT , D ISCIPLINE AND P UNISH 42 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage
Books 2d ed. 1995).
19. See, e.g., Talia Fisher, Constitutionalism and the Criminal Law: Rethinking Criminal
Trial Bifurcation, 61 U. T ORONTO L.J. 811, 814 (2011); Bray, supra note 12, at 1304–7;
Andrew D. Leipold, The Problem of the Innocent, Acquitted Defendant, 94 N W . U. L. R EV .
1297, 1314–26 (2000); Paul H. Robinson, Rules of Conduct and Principles of Adjudication, 57
U. C HI . L. R EV . 729, 766–67 (1990).
20. This label is borrowed from the one used by Professor Fisher for her own ‘‘probabilistic model.’’ Fisher, supra note 10, at 836.
21. Bray, supra note 12, at 1304–7.
22. Robinson, supra note 19, at 766–67.
23. Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 C OLUM . L. R EV .
199, 290 (1982).
24. Leipold, supra note 19, at 1314–26.
25. Fisher, supra note 19, at 814.
26. See, e.g., Bray, supra note 12, at 1304–7; Leipold, supra note 19, at 1314–26; Robinson,
supra note 19, at 766–67.
27. Fisher, supra note 19, at 814.
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certainly violate the Constitution’s Due Process Clause by permitting punishment on less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.28

II. THE THRESHOLD MODEL OF SENTENCING

This Part will argue that the penalty stage of criminal proceedings in the
federal court system also uses a threshold model of decision making.
Although a number of scholars have already discussed the threshold model
of conviction, this Article breaks new ground with a critical analysis of the
threshold model of sentencing. The United States Sentencing Guidelines
instruct district courts to make a series of factual ﬁndings about each
offender and his crime, which are then plugged into an equation that
calculates a recommended sentence for each offender. This approach reﬂects a threshold model of decision making: the Guidelines require district
courts to make a series of all-or-nothing judgments about whether certain
facts are either true or untrue, and each judgment turns on whether the
probability of each fact’s truth exceeds a certain threshold level of likelihood. There are, of course, some differences between trials and sentencing
hearings, but fundamentally, both rely on a threshold approach.
A. The Federal Law of Sentencing
1. The Sentencing Hearing

Once a defendant has been convicted at trial, he is subject to a penalty
speciﬁed by statute. Federal criminal statutes usually provide for ﬁnes along
with a broad range of possible prison terms. For instance, the punishment
for physically assaulting a federal ofﬁcer is a ﬁne and ‘‘imprison[ment] of
not more than 20 years,’’ or both.29 At a sentencing hearing held after the
trial, both the prosecution and the convicted defendant have the chance to
argue for an appropriate sentence from within that range.30 A district court
judge will then make the ﬁnal decision. Before she does so, however, the
judge must consider a list of factors prescribed by Congress, including the
28. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362–64 (1970) (quoting LeLand v. Oregon, 343 U.S.
790, 802 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
29. See 18 U.S.C. § 111; id. at § 1114.
30. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007); F ED . R. C RIM . P. 32(i)(4).
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sentence recommended by the United States Sentencing Guidelines. These
factors are discussed in greater detail below.31
It is important to remember that when a federal judge sentences a defendant,
she considers his ‘‘real offense,’’ rather than his ‘‘charged offense.’’32 What this
means is that the sentencing judge makes her own ﬁndings of fact about
what the offender ‘‘really’’ did—she is not limited to the allegations listed in
the indictment or proved to the jury at trial. In fact, sentencing courts can even
consider criminal conduct for which the offender was speciﬁcally acquitted.33
It is also important to remember that a sentencing hearing is governed
by rules of evidence very different from those at trial. One signiﬁcant
change is that the standard of proof at sentencing is much lower than it
is at trial—a ‘‘preponderance of the evidence’’ rather than proof beyond
a reasonable doubt.34 In other words, for a fact to be established at sentencing, it must be ‘‘more likely than not’’ to be true, a level of proof
quantiﬁed as just over 50 percent probability of truth.35 The standards for
the admissibility of evidence are also less restrictive at sentencing than they
are at trial, so that, for example, hearsay evidence is admissible,36 as is
evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.37
2. The § 3553(a) Factors

In Title 18, Section 3553(a) of the U.S. Code, Congress provides federal
district courts with a list of factors that they must consider before sentencing a convicted defendant.38 Those factors are:
31. See infra, Section II.A.2.
32. U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt. A.1(4)(a); see also Deborah Young, Fact-Finding at Federal
Sentencing: Why the Guidelines Should Meet the Rules, 79 C ORNELL L. R EV . 299, 323 (1994).
33. See United States v. White, 551 F.3d 381, 383–84 (6th Cir. 2008) (collecting cases).
34. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 84–91 (1986); Young, supra note 32, at 335-38.
35. See Vern R. Walker, Preponderance, Probability, and Warranted Factﬁnding, 62 B ROOK .
L. R EV . 1075, 1076 n.5 (1996) (collecting sources). In contrast to the debate over quantifying
the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, see supra note 14, it seems difﬁcult to dispute that
the preponderance standard is equivalent to 50% likelihood. Still, Professor Walker has argued
on policy grounds against quantiﬁcation even of the preponderance standard. See generally
Walker, supra. But even from Professor Walker’s perspective, the argument in this Article will
still hold if one simply uses the 50% ﬁgure as shorthand for ‘‘some level of probability below
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ Cf. supra, text at note 14.
36. See Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 584 (1959).
37. See United States v. Brimah, 214 F.3d 854, 857 (7th Cir. 2000) (collecting cases).
38. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553.
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1. the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant;
2. the need for the sentence imposed—
(A) to reﬂect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for
the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment
in the most effective manner; [and]
3. the kinds of sentences available;
4. the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range . . . set forth in the
guidelines.39
Translated into plain English, § 3553(a)(1) instructs courts to individually
review the unique circumstances of the offender and his crime. Next, §§
3553(a)(2) says that courts must consider the retributive, deterrent, incapacitative, and rehabilitative theories of punishment.40 After that, § 3553(a)(3)
directs courts to take into account all the possible sentences available.
Finally, and most importantly,41 § 3553(a)(4) instructs courts to consider
the sentence recommended by the United States Sentencing Guidelines,
discussed in greater detail in the next section.
3. The United States Sentencing Guidelines

The United States Sentencing Guidelines are published annually by the
United States Sentencing Commission, an agency created by Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984. The Guidelines recommend a standardized sentence
based on the speciﬁc facts of each case in order to ‘‘eliminate wide disparity’’ in the punishments imposed on similarly situated offenders.42
At the outset, the Guidelines assign each generic crime a different ‘‘base
offense level.’’ Two offenders convicted of the same crime will therefore
start at the same offense level. For example, the Sentencing Guidelines
39. See id.
40. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367 (1989).
41. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007).
42. U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt. A.1(g); see also 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B)(1988); Mistretta, 488 U.S.
at 362.
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assign the crime of aggravated assault a base offense level of 14.43 The
district judge can then adjust that level according to a speciﬁc set of rules
tied to the unique characteristics of the particular act of wrongdoing at
issue.44 At the end of the process, therefore, two defendants convicted of
the same offense may have very different offense levels, depending on the
facts of their particular cases. For instance, the base level of 14 for aggravated assault can be adjusted as follows:
1. If the assault involved more than minimal planning, increase by 2
levels.
2. If (A) a ﬁrearm was discharged, increase by 5 levels; (B) a dangerous
weapon (including a ﬁrearm) was otherwise used, increase by 4
levels; (C) a dangerous weapon (including a ﬁrearm) was brandished
or its use was threatened, increase by 3 levels . . .
3. If the assault was motivated by a payment or offer of money or other
thing of value, increase by 2 levels . . . 45
These are just a small sample. The aggravated assault Guideline also provides for adjustment of the offense level depending on the injury suffered
by the victim, the offender’s ﬁnancial motivation, and whether the offender
violated a court protection order when committing the assault.46
More generally, the Sentencing Guidelines also include a set of upward
and downward adjustments that can apply to any kind of crime, based on
facts about the victim and the offender. An offense level may be adjusted
upward, for example, if the victim was particularly vulnerable,47 if the
defendant had an aggravating role in the offense,48 or if the defendant
43. See U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2.
44. The base offense level itself may also depend on a predicate factual ﬁnding. For
example, the crime of involuntary manslaughter has a base offense level of 12 if the offense
involved criminally negligent conduct, 18 if the offense involved reckless conduct, or 22 if
the offense involved the reckless operation of a means of transportation. U.S.S.G. § 2A1.
4(a). This scaling of the base offense level is effectively the same as making adjustments to
the base offense level, the only difference being that the adjustment is made before the base
level is chosen, rather than after the fact. Therefore, this article will analyze both the initial
selection of the base offense level and subsequent adjustments to that level under the same
rubric.
45. See id. at § 2A2.2.
46. See id.
47. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 3, Pt. A.
48. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 3, Pt. B.
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attempted to obstruct justice after the crime.49 Conversely, the offense level
can be lowered if the defendant had a mitigating role in the offense or if he
accepted responsibility for his wrongdoing.50
The Sentencing Guidelines tie each upward or downward adjustment to
the base offense level to a particular factual predicate. In order to adjust the
offense level, therefore, the sentencing judge must make a factual ﬁnding
on the record. Because the standard of proof at sentencing is a preponderance of the evidence, the prosecution has the burden to establish that each
fact central to an upward adjustment of the offense level is ‘‘more likely
than not’’ to be true.51 Similarly, to obtain a downward adjustment, the
offender must prove that the facts supporting that reduction are more than
50 percent likely to be true.52
After the court has ﬁnished adjusting the offense level for the particular
crime at issue, that ﬁnal number is called the ‘‘total offense level.’’ The
sentencing court then plugs that number into a two-axis Sentencing
Table,53 comparing it against the offender’s ‘‘criminal history category.’’54
The intersection of these two numbers across the Table yields a narrow
range of months in prison, which constitutes the Guidelines’ recommended term of incarceration for that case.55 For example, an offense level
of 5 and criminal history category of II would yield a recommended sentence of zero to six months. A much higher offense level of 39 and criminal
history category III would result in a recommended sentence of 324 to 405
months.56
According to the Supreme Court, this recommended sentence is a ‘‘starting point and the initial benchmark,’’ but it is not binding on the district
court; the sentencing judge may still select any appropriate punishment
from within the statutory range.57 The Sentencing Commission initially
49. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 3, Pt. C.
50. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 3, Pt. E.
51. See, e.g., United States v. Sklar, 920 F.2d 107, 112 (1st Cir. 1990).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Morillo, 8 F.3d 864, 871 (1st Cir. 1993).
53. See U.S.S.G. Sentencing Table.
54. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 4.
55. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A.
56. See U.S.S.G. Sentencing Table.
57. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007); see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220, 244–58 (2005). Indeed, the district court’s sentence may be reversed if it treats the
Guidelines as mandatory, and it is even prohibited from presuming that the Guidelines
range is reasonable. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50–51 (2007).
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intended the Guidelines to be mandatory, but the Supreme Court’s 2005
decision in United States v. Booker 58 rendered them merely advisory.
A district judge is therefore free to vary from the Guidelines’ recommendation if the case presents circumstances ‘‘not adequately taken into
consideration by the Sentencing Commission’’59: for example, if the recommended sentence does not ﬁt the circumstances of the case or the goals
of sentencing laid out in § 3553(a), or if the judge simply disagrees with the
policy views of the Sentencing Commission on the matter.60
B. The Sentencing Guidelines Use a Threshold Model of
Decision Making
1. The Threshold Nature of Offense Level Adjustments

The Sentencing Guidelines reﬂect a threshold model of decision-making.
When a district judge uses the Guidelines to calculate a recommended
sentence, she makes a series of binary decisions about whether or not
various enhancements or reductions should apply to the offender’s base
offense level. These decisions depend on whether the facts supporting each
enhancement or reduction exceed a 50 percent threshold level of probability. If the probability of a factual predicate for a sentence adjustment
exceeds 50 percent, then the sentencing court will regard that fact as true
and apply the corresponding adjustment. If the probability is less than
50 percent, then the court will treat the fact as untrue and the adjustment
will not apply. The ﬁnal recommended Guidelines sentence, therefore, is
the outcome of a string of threshold decisions about the defendant’s
culpability.
Like the threshold model of conviction, the threshold model of sentencing is an all-or-nothing system. If a sentencing judge is more than
50 percent sure that the factual predicate for an adjustment is true, then
the adjustment will apply in full—and the offender’s recommended sentence will be increased—without regard to whether the judge was 51 percent or 100 percent convinced of the matter. Similarly, if the judge is less
than 50 percent sure that the adjustment should apply, then it will not
58. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1); see also U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0(2) & (3).
60. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 49–50; Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101, 109–10
(2007).
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apply at all, even if the judge’s degree of certainty fell just short of the
requisite level. Only the 50 percent threshold level of probability matters.
2. Differences Between Threshold Conviction and Sentencing

There are two obvious differences between the threshold model of conviction and the Guidelines’ threshold model of sentencing. Yet on closer
inspection, each of these differences is actually less signiﬁcant than it
initially appears.
a. The Gradated Nature of the Sentencing Guidelines. First, the calculation

of a Guidelines sentence is more gradated, and less binary, than the determination of guilt at trial. A guilty verdict is a categorical declaration of the
defendant’s culpability: two different defendants convicted of the same
offense will receive identical convictions, even if the details of their actual
crimes varied signiﬁcantly. By contrast, each Guidelines sentence reﬂects
a precise measure of the offender’s particular degree of wrongdoing. The
total offense level rises or falls based on the details of each crime, so that two
different defendants convicted of aggravated assault may receive very different recommended sentences depending on the severity of their
transgressions.61
But while the calculation of a Guidelines sentence is more gradated than
the binary choice of whether or not to convict a defendant, it is still
a threshold model of decision making, not a probabilistic approach. Each
adjustment to the offense level depends only on whether the factual predicate for that adjustment is more than 50 percent likely to be true. Once
that probability threshold has been crossed, the adjustment applies in full.
Levels of probability above or below that threshold are therefore irrelevant.
The difference between a gradated and a probabilistic model of decision
making is most obvious with the largest sentence adjustments. For example, the Sentencing Guidelines assign a base offense level of 9 to the crime
of ‘‘possessing dangerous materials on an aircraft.’’ The Guidelines then
61. See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon
Which They Rest, 17 H OFSTRA L. R EV . 1, 9 (1988). In this way, the Guidelines sentence
calculation recalls the medieval model of partial punishment described by Foucault: each
factual predicate for an upward adjustment ‘‘arouse[s] a particular degree of abomination . . . and consequently involve[s] a degree of punishment.’’ F OUCAULT , supra note 18,
at 42.
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instruct that the sentencing judge should increase that level by 15 points if
the defendant committed the offense ‘‘willfully and without regard for the
safety of human life.’’62 The effect of that upward adjustment is to raise the
recommended sentence for a ﬁrst-time offender from 4 to 10 months up to
51 to 63 months.63 In other words, the Guidelines instruct that, so long as it
is more than 50 percent likely that the offender’s possession of dangerous
materials on the airplane was willful and without regard for human life, his
prison term should be increased at least ﬁve-fold, without regard to the
court’s precise level of conﬁdence in that conclusion. Therefore, although
the ﬁnal outcome of a Guidelines sentence calculation does reﬂect a more
gradated judgment of the offender’s wrongdoing, each step in that calculation still employs a threshold model of decision making.
b. The Nonbinding Nature of the Sentencing Guidelines. The second dif-

ference between the threshold models of conviction and sentencing is that
the recommended Guidelines sentence is not ofﬁcially binding on the
district court. Although the Sentencing Guidelines are formally nonbinding, they still exert a strong gravitational pull on district courts.64
Despite their advisory nature, the federal law of sentencing uses several
sources of pressure to encourage district courts to adhere to the Guidelines’
recommendations. District courts must calculate a recommended Guidelines sentence in every single case, and they are required both to ‘‘begin
their analysis with the Guidelines’’ and to ‘‘remain cognizant of them
throughout the sentencing process.’’65 It is a reversible error for a district
court to improperly calculate the Guidelines range.66 The more a district
judge varies from the Guidelines recommendation, the more thorough
a justiﬁcation for that variance she must provide.67 Furthermore, only
within-Guidelines sentences may be presumed reasonable on appeal.68
62. U.S.S.G. § 2K1.5(a) & (b)(1). For another, slightly less dramatic, example, the crime
of mishandling environmental pollutants has a base offense level of 6, but that level can be
adjusted upward by 11 points if the district court ﬁnds that ‘‘the offense resulted in a substantial likelihood of death or serious bodily injury.’’ Id. at § 2Q1.3(a) & (b)(2).
63. U.S.S.G. Sentencing Table.
64. See United States v. Ingram, 721 F.3d 35, 40–41 (2d Cir. 2013).
65. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 50 n.6.
66. See id. at 51.
67. See id. at 50.
68. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007).
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The empirical evidence shows that this pressure has a signiﬁcant effect
on sentencing outcomes. The Supreme Court has observed that ‘‘[i]n the
usual sentencing, . . . the judge . . . use[s] the Guidelines range as the starting point in the analysis and impose[s] a sentence within [that] range.’’69
‘‘In less than one-ﬁfth of cases since 2007 have district courts imposed
above- or below-Guidelines sentences absent a Government motion’’70
and more than half of all sentences handed down in 2012 followed the
recommendations of the Sentencing Guidelines.71 ‘‘[T]he Sentencing
Commission’s data indicate that when a Guidelines range moves up or
down, offenders’ sentences move with it.’’72 Indeed, an in-depth statistical
study of pre- and post-Booker federal sentencing practices revealed that, for
the most part, district judges ‘‘continue[] to adhere to the Guidelines to
a striking degree,’’73 leading the author of the study to conclude that ‘‘the
most surprising fact about Booker is just how small an effect it actually
had. . . . The Guidelines still matter. They still matter nearly as much as
they did on the day before Booker was decided.’’74 In sum, although district
judges are not ofﬁcially required to use a threshold model of sentencing, the
powerful inﬂuence of the Sentencing Guidelines ensures that in most cases,
they do.

III. FLAWED JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE THRESHOLD
MODEL OF SENTENCING

This Part will review three justiﬁcations that courts and commentators have
offered for the threshold model of conviction. It will show that these
justiﬁcations do not hold in the unique context of a sentencing hearing.
69. Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. __, __ (2011) (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 5).
70. Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. __, __ (2013) (slip. op. at 12–13) (emphasis added).
Furthermore, although criminal convictions rendered by a jury are generally treated as
binding, federal district judges technically retain the power to acquit convicted defendants
‘‘notwithstanding the verdict.’’ See F ED . R. C RIM . P. 29(c)(2).
71. U.S. Sentencing Commission, Final Quarterly Data Report, Fiscal Year 2012, http://
www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Federal_Sentencing_Statistics/Quarterly_Sentencing_
Updates/USSC_2012_Quarter_Report_Final.pdf.
72. Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. __, __ (2013) (slip. op. at 12–13).
73. Frank O. Bowman III, Dead Law Walking: The Surprising Tenacity of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 51 H OUSTON L. R EV . 1227, 1255 (2014).
74. Id. at 1230, 1269.

231

232 |

NEW CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | VOL. 18 | NO. 2 | SPRING 2015

First, the threshold model of conviction is said to protect the presumption
of innocence. That presumption, however, would not bar a district judge
from varying an offender’s punishment based on probabilities above the
requisite threshold level of proof at sentencing. Second, the threshold
model of conviction sends a substantive, rather than evidentiary, message,
which may assist the deterrent function of punishment. But if conviction
sends a substantive message, then sentencing need not do so, and moreover, deterrence is not the only reason for criminal punishment. Finally,
the threshold model of conviction streamlines the decision-making process
for the jury. The federal law of sentencing, however, is already fairly
streamlined, and so an even more simpliﬁed process is not necessary.
A. Protecting the Presumption of Innocence

First, the threshold model helps to protect the presumption of innocence
by setting a hard ﬂoor of certainty below which the government may not
punish an accused defendant. The presumption of innocence, however,
only requires that punishment be prohibited below a certain level of probable guilt. The presumption would not be threatened if courts took
account of probabilities above the requisite threshold level. At trial, this
insight does little good, because there is so little room to maneuver above
the threshold level of proof required for conviction. But at sentencing,
there is a large range of probabilities available that courts could consider
when calculating a recommended Guidelines sentence.
The presumption of innocence is ‘‘axiomatic and elementary’’ to
American criminal justice.75 It provides that a criminal defendant is
assumed innocent unless and until the government can prove him
guilty.76 The threshold model of decision making guarantees this protection against arbitrary punishment by establishing a minimum level of
proof that the government must meet in order to convict a defendant:
95 percent probability of guilt.77 A return to the medieval model of
conviction, where ‘‘partial punishments’’ were imposed on ﬁndings of
‘‘partial guilt,’’ would dilute the presumption of innocence by making
75. Cofﬁn v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 452–53 (1895); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 363 (1970).
76. See Cofﬁn, 156 U.S. at 452–53.
77. See Fisher, supra note 10, at 882 & n.170.
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it easier for the government to establish that a person accused of a crime
deserves punishment.78
At sentencing, the presumption of innocence is not quite so axiomatic,
but there is still a small presumption in favor of offenders’ liberty. Ofﬁcially, once a defendant has been convicted of a crime, the presumption of
innocence is said to ‘‘disappear[].’’79 In practice, however, the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard used at sentencing still presumes the defendant’s innocence in cases where the evidence supporting and opposing
a sentence enhancement is equally split. In other words, when the probability of the factual predicate for an increase to the offender’s sentence is
exactly 50 percent, the offender prevails and the enhancement does not
apply.80 A model of decision making that permitted sentence enhancements based on levels of probability lower than 50 percent would dilute
even this minimal presumption of innocence.
The justice system could, however, take account of probabilities above
the requisite threshold level of proof without endangering the presumption
of innocence. Put another way, the presumption of innocence only forbids
‘‘partial punishments’’ for ‘‘partial guilt’’ because they would make it too
easy for the government to punish suspected wrongdoers. Higher punishments for more certain guilt, however, would not violate the presumption of
innocence. Nor would lower punishments for less certain guilt, so long as
the minimum threshold of certainty had been met.
At trial, for example, it would be consistent with the presumption of
innocence to impose a more damning conviction when the probability of
the offender’s guilt was over 95 percent. Alternatively, the jury could mitigate the offender’s guilty verdict the farther the probability of his guilt fell
from 100 percent, with zero punishment for levels of certainty below
95 percent. Of course, the range of probabilities at issue here is so small
as to be practically meaningless. Professor Larry Tribe argues, for example,
that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof ‘‘come[s] as close to
certainty as human knowledge allows.’’81 It would be impossible, according
78. See Bray, supra note 12, at 1312.
79. Delo v. Lashley, 507 U.S. 272, 278 (1993); see also Young, supra note 32, at 357.
80. See United States v. Gigante, 94 F.3d 53, 55 (1996). For sentence reductions, the
presumption is placed slightly in favor of the government, since when the evidence in favor of
reducing an offender’s sentence is balanced, the law of sentencing holds that the prosecution
should prevail. See, e.g., United States v. Morillo, 8 F.3d 864, 871 (1st Cir. 1993).
81. Tribe, supra note 14, at 388.
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to Tribe, to vary punishments based on levels of certainty above that level.
Even if one disagreed with Professor Tribe, moreover, the tiny epistemic
difference between 95 and 100percent probability of guilt would make it
very difﬁcult to accurately and consistently differentiate between guilty
offenders.
At sentencing, however, the lower standard of proof leaves open
a much wider range of epistemic space above the threshold level of
certainty. The justice system commonly recognizes at least two levels of
probability above the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard: ‘‘clear
and convincing evidence’’ and proof ‘‘beyond a reasonable doubt,’’ which
correspond roughly to 70 percent and 95 percent probability.82 A district
judge could thus easily vary the size of an upward adjustment to an
offender’s offense level based on her level of conﬁdence that its factual
predicate had been fulﬁlled. For instance, she might increase the size of
the sentence enhancement as the odds of its factual predicate rose above
50 percent. Or, she could decrease it the further the odds fell farther from
100 percent, with zero enhancement for levels of certainty below
50 percent.
In sum, the threshold model of decision making protects the presumption of innocence, but that justiﬁcation for the threshold model only
prohibits the consideration of probabilities below the threshold level of
certainty, not above that level. Although this observation does little good
at trial, where the threshold level of certainty is set extremely high, it is
quite relevant at sentencing, where the burden of proof is lower and the
epistemic range in play much greater. As this Article will show later on,83
the Sentencing Guidelines’ failure to take account of variations in probability above the 50 percent threshold creates serious problems in the
administration of criminal justice, and may in fact implicate the very due
process concerns that animate the presumption of innocence itself.
B. Sending a Substantive, Rather than Evidentiary, Message

Second, the threshold model facilitates the deterrent function of the criminal law by sending a substantive message about the outcome of the
82. See, e.g., United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 403–6 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (Weinstein, J.).
83. See infra, Part IV.
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proceedings. That function, however, need not be served at every stage of
the judicial process, especially not at sentencing. Moreover, deterrence is
not the only purpose of criminal punishment.
Professor Charles Nesson argues that for a conviction to have a deterrent
effect, the guilty verdict must send a ‘‘substantive’’ message about the
defendant’s conduct, rather than an ‘‘evidentiary’’ one.84 In other words,
the guilty verdict must declare that the defendant committed a crime, not
that the prosecution established with 95 percent certainty that the defendant committed a crime. This helps foster public trust in the criminal
justice system by presenting trial outcomes as statements of fact, rather
than best guesses.85 It also ‘‘forges a link between the judicial account of the
defendant’s transgression and [the public’s] own behavior,’’ communicating that bad acts lead to punishment, rather than bad evidence.86 According to Nesson, future offenders will feel more obligated to respect this
substantive, rather than evidentiary, conception of criminal justice. Professor Nesson therefore endorses the threshold model of conviction, which
presents the outcome of a criminal trial as a ‘‘statement about what happened,’’ rather than a ‘‘statement about the evidence.’’87
Nesson’s argument, while persuasive, also overstates the importance of
the deterrent message in criminal law. First, even if one agrees that the
justice system should send a ‘‘substantive’’ message about criminal trials,
Professor Nesson does not explain why it is necessary to communicate such
a message at every stage of the proceedings. Sentencing comes after conviction, so the guilty verdict will already have expressed a substantive condemnation of the defendant’s conduct. Moreover, although sentencing
hearings are open to the public, they do not involve juries of attentive
community members, nor do they commonly attract the same attention as
trials. Therefore, even accepting Nesson’s argument, there is still less of
a need at sentencing to attach a substantive meaning to the outcome of the
proceedings.
Second, deterrence is only one of the purposes of criminal punishment.88
Three other reasons for punishing wrongdoers, equally endorsed by

84. See Nesson, supra note 10, at 1361–62.
85. See id. at 1362.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B).
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Congress in § 3553(a), are the retributive, incapacitative, and rehabilitative
theories of punishment.89 These approaches do not incarcerate simply to
send a warning to future wrongdoers; they use prison as an end in itself. The
retributive model, for instance, uses prison as ‘‘just punishment for the
offense.’’90 The incapacitative approach incarcerates as a means to ‘‘protect
the public from further crimes of the defendant.’’91 Finally, the rehabilitative
theory seeks to provide ‘‘the defendant . . . needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment.’’92 Because these
theories do not depend on communicating any message, they are effective
whether or not the justice system attaches a ‘‘substantive’’ or an ‘‘evidentiary’’
meaning to criminal punishment.
At best, therefore, deterrence is only a partial justiﬁcation for the threshold model of sentencing. It is less important to send a substantive message
at sentencing, since that message will already have been communicated by
the defendant’s conviction at trial. Moreover, deterrence is only one of the
purposes of criminal punishment, and the other three purposes listed in
§ 3553(a) do not rely on sending a substantive message. The deterrent
beneﬁt of threshold sentencing, therefore, must be carefully weighed
against the signiﬁcant problems with the approach, discussed below.93
C. Streamlining the Decision-Making Process

Finally, the threshold model spares decision makers the difﬁcult task of
making ﬁne-grain probability determinations. However, although it may
be important to simplify the decision-making process for juries of twelve
attempting to reach consensus about a defendant’s guilt, it is much easier
for a single district court judge calculating a recommended Guidelines
sentence to take more precise account of probability.
The threshold model of conviction asks the jury to answer a simple
question: Does the prosecution’s evidence establish that the likelihood that
the defendant committed a crime is ‘‘beyond a reasonable doubt,’’ or more
than 95 percent probable? Because it does not demand any more speciﬁcs,
89. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), (C), & (D); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361, 367 (1989).
90. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A).
91. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C).
92. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D).
93. See infra Part IV.
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the threshold model avoids requiring juries ‘‘to ascribe accurate probabilities to their ﬁndings.’’94 That assignment would be particularly difﬁcult at
the high degrees of conﬁdence required to obtain a conviction, since it
would ask juries to distinguish between cases in which the odds of the
defendant’s guilt was 95, 96, 97, 98 percent, and so on. Indeed, the assignment would be a challenge even for an individual juror, let alone twelve
working together to agree on a consensus decision.
At sentencing, however, the simplicity of the threshold model is much
less attractive, since the epistemic space at issue is larger and the number of
decision makers fewer. As already explained, the probability range above
the preponderance-of-the-evidence threshold is quite large: between 51 and
100 percent likelihood that the factual predicate for sentence enhancement
has been satisﬁed. So, although it might be difﬁcult for a jury at trial to
differentiate between cases of 95 and 100 percent likelihood of guilt, it
would be much easier for a sentencing judge to recognize gradations along
the spectrum of probability available to her—for example, 51 versus
70 versus 95 percent probability of guilt (which roughly correlate with the
preponderance-of-the-evidence, clear-and-convincing-evidence, and
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standards of proof).95 Similarly, although it
might be difﬁcult for twelve jurors to agree on their shared level of conﬁdence in a defendant’s guilt, there would be no such problem at sentencing,
where a single federal judge gets to decide on her own the applicability of
various sentence enhancements. The threshold model, therefore, is not
necessary to streamline the decision-making process at sentencing in the
same way that it is at trial.
Even for a single decision maker, it may be difﬁcult to reliably and
consistently estimate probabilities. Still, the pragmatic argument for the
threshold model wields far less force at sentencing than it does at trial, given
the wider range of probabilities available and the smaller number of decision makers. Especially given the ﬂaws of threshold sentencing, discussed
in the next section,96 it may well be worth placing an additional burden on
district judges in order to take better account of probability at the penalty
stage of criminal proceedings.
94. Alon Harel and Ariel Porat, Aggregating Probabilities Across Cases: Criminal
Responsibility for Unspeciﬁed Offenses, 94 M INN . L. R EV . 261, 299 (2009).
95. See United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 403–6 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (Weinstein, J.).
96. See infra, Part IV.
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IV. SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS WITH THE THRESHOLD
MODEL OF SENTENCING

This Part will review the two problems that courts and commentators have
observed with the threshold model of conviction. It will demonstrate that
these ﬂaws are even more severe in the threshold model of sentencing. First,
the threshold model of conviction is inefﬁcient, because it does not prioritize the allocation of punishment resources based on the likelihood that
they will be spent on guilty offenders. That inefﬁciency is particularly bad
at sentencing, because the burden of proof on the government is lower and
fewer fact-ﬁndings are necessary to increase an offender’s sentence. Second,
the threshold model of conviction is unfair, because it denies innocent
offenders the beneﬁt of any doubts about their guilt. Once again, this
problem is especially severe at the penalty stage of the proceedings, where
the standard of proof is signiﬁcantly lower than it is at trial, and fewer factﬁndings are necessary to impose increased punishment.
A. The Threshold Model of Decision Making is Inefficient
1. The Threshold Model Wastes Punishment Resources

The threshold model of decision making is inefﬁcient. Professors Talia
Fisher and Henrick Lando have demonstrated this point in regard to the
threshold model of conviction, using an analytical framework that relies on
a deterrence theory of punishment.97
To begin, each Professor observes that punishment of the innocent does
not communicate an effective deterrent warning to future wrongdoers.98
The deterrent value of a criminal punishment will, therefore, depend on
whether it is imposed on a factually guilty or factually innocent defendant.
Taking that premise one step further, Fisher and Lando aver that punishment of offenders who are more likely to be guilty will, on the whole, have
more deterrent value than the punishment of offenders who are less likely
to be guilty. Fisher explains: ‘‘Just as punishment of the factually innocent
yields a lower deterrent effect than punishment of the factually guilty,
punishment of defendants whose probability of guilt is low yields a lower
97. See Fisher, supra note 10, at 855–56 & n.86; Henrik Lando, The Size of the Sanction
Should Depend on the Weight of the Evidence, 1 R EV . L. & E CON . 277, 282 (2005).
98. See Fisher, supra note 10, at 855–56.
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deterrent effect than identical punishment imposed upon defendants
whose certainty of guilt is high.’’99
The threshold model of conviction, however, does not distinguish
between defendants based on the probability of their guilt. The model
condemns equally those who are without a doubt guilty (and whose punishment will be most likely to have deterrent value) and those who are only
beyond a reasonable doubt guilty (and whose punishment will be slightly less
likely to have an impact). According to Fisher and Lando’s framework,
then, the threshold model of conviction will inevitably spend more punishment resources than it needs (and will needlessly extract more of the
social costs that accompany incarceration).100 It would be more efﬁcient,
instead, to punish offenders based on the likelihood that those punishment
resources would be well spent. ‘‘[T]he greater the certainty of the defendant’s guilt, the lesser the concern of ‘wasting’ punishment resources while
obtaining a weaker deterrence effect, and vice versa.’’101
This same inefﬁciency is also present in the threshold model of sentencing. Begin again with Lando and Fisher’s initial premise: just like conviction of the innocent does not communicate an effective deterrent warning,
so too will an erroneous increase to an offender’s sentence fail to deter
future wrongdoers. The deterrent value of a sentence enhancement, therefore, depends on whether the factual predicate for that enhancement was
actually fulﬁlled. Or to paraphrase Professor Fisher, a sentence enhancement applied when its factual predicate is less probably fulﬁlled will have
a lower deterrent effect than when the enhancement’s factual predicate is
more probably fulﬁlled.102
The threshold model of sentencing, however, applies sentence enhancements without regard to the probability that their factual predicates have
been fulﬁlled. The model increases sentences equally in cases where the
factual predicate has almost certainly been fulﬁlled and those in which the
predicate has only more than likely been fulﬁlled. As a result, the Sentencing
Guidelines will inevitably recommend longer sentences than necessary. Just
like with convictions, therefore, it would be more efﬁcient for sentencing
99. See id.; see also Michael T. Cahill, Punishment Pluralism, in R ETRIBUTIVISM : E SSAYS
T HEORY AND P OLICY 36 (Mark D. White ed., 2011).
100. See Fisher, supra note 10, at 856 n.86. For an in-depth discussion of the costs and
beneﬁts of punishment, see generally Cahill, supra note 99.
101. See id.
102. Cf. id. at 855–56.
ON
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judges to vary punishments based on the probability that they will have an
effective deterrent impact.
2. The Threshold Model Wastes More Resources at Sentencing than
at Trial

Two unique features of the law of sentencing make the threshold model of
decision making even more inefﬁcient at sentencing than it is at trial.
First, the lower burden of proof at sentencing means that errors are more
common at this stage of the proceedings. As explained earlier, the epistemic
range above the threshold level of probability required for a conviction—
proof ‘‘beyond a reasonable doubt’’—is very narrow.103 As a result, the
threshold model of conviction will only waste punishment resources on
innocent offenders in a very small number of cases: 5 percent of those
decided on 95 percent probability of guilt.
At sentencing, however, the threshold standard of proof drops from 95 to
50 percent. This lower threshold opens up a much larger epistemic bandwidth, which leaves much more room for error. In roughly one out of every
two upward adjustments decided on 51 percent probability, the factual predicate for the adjustment will not actually have been fulﬁlled, and so the
expense of increasing the offender’s sentence will have been wasted. The
threshold model of sentencing will therefore waste punishment resources in
many more cases than will the threshold model of conviction.
Second, sentences are enhanced based on a disjunctive series of factual
predicates, whereas a guilty verdict depends on a conjunctive group of factﬁndings. This makes it much easier for the threshold model of sentencing to
waste punishment resources. To convict a defendant at trial, the jury must
ﬁnd that he ‘‘is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged,
beyond a reasonable doubt.’’104 The odds of an erroneous conviction, therefore, are quite low. For instance, the federal crime of kidnapping requires the
government to prove four facts: that the defendant (1) knowingly transported
(2) an unconsenting person (3) in interstate commerce (4) in order to hold
him for ransom, reward, or otherwise.105 If a jury convicts a defendant of
kidnapping based on 95 percent probability that each of these four facts is
103. See supra, Part III.A.
104. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995) (emphasis added).
105. See United States v. Barton, 257 F.3d 433, 439 (5th Cir. 2001); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 1201.
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true, there will be an 81 percent chance that its decision to return a guilty
verdict will be the correct one and a 19 percent chance that punishment
resources will have been wasted on an erroneous conviction.106
By contrast, a sentencing judge may increase an offender’s punishment
based on her ﬁnding that any of the multiple possible factual predicates for
a sentence enhancement is more than 50 percent likely to have been fulﬁlled. As explained earlier, the Sentencing Guidelines enumerate speciﬁc
upward adjustments for each crime, with each adjustment triggered by
a particular predicate fact.107 The Guidelines also include general sentence
adjustments that may apply to all crimes.108 Each time a judge ﬁnds that
one of the factual predicates for an adjustment has been satisﬁed, the
associated sentence enhancement immediately applies, making it much
more likely that a judge will wrongly extend a sentence than that a jury
will wrongly convict.
For example, the offense-speciﬁc adjustments for kidnapping include:
1. If a ransom demand or a demand upon government was made,
increase by 6 levels.
2. (A) If the victim sustained permanent or life-threatening bodily
injury, increase by 4 levels; (B) if the victim sustained serious bodily
injury, increase by 2 levels; or (C) if the degree of injury is between
that speciﬁed in subdivisions (A) and (B), increase by 3 levels.
3. If a dangerous weapon was used, increase by 2 levels.
4. (A) If the victim was not released before thirty days had elapsed,
increase by 2 levels. (B) If the victim was not released before seven
days had elapsed, increase by 1 level.109
So, if a judge increases a kidnapper’s sentence by 2 levels based on
a 51 percent probability that he used a dangerous weapon,110 there will
be a 51 percent chance that the decision to increase the sentence will be the
106. Cf. Ariel Porat & Eric A. Posner, Aggregation and the Law, 122 Y ALE L.J. 3, 38 (2012)
(noting that defendants are convicted when juries are convinced that the defendant’s guilt is
95% probable with respect to each element, even though aggregating those probabilities
would yield a level of certainty less than 95%); see also Model Penal Code § 1.12(1) (1962)
(‘‘No person may be convicted of an offense unless each element of such offense is proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.’’) (emphasis added).
107. See supra, Part II.A.3.
108. See generally U.S.S.G. Ch. 3.
109. U.S.S.G. § 2A4.1(b).
110. See U.S.S.G. § 2A4.1(b)(3).
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correct one and a 49 percent chance that punishment resources will have
been wasted on an erroneous sentence enhancement. Even worse, if a judge
decides to apply multiple sentence enhancements at that same level of
conﬁdence—say, ﬁve different offense-speciﬁc adjustments and three general adjustments—there will be only a 0.4 percent chance that the resulting
total offense level is factually accurate, and a 99.6 percent chance that
a sentence based on the total offense level will be longer than necessary.
Because conviction depends on a conjunctive set of fact-ﬁndings but
a sentence increase relies on a disjunctive group of possible factual predicates, the odds that a sentencing judge will impose too harsh a sentence are
much higher than the odds that a jury will hold the wrong person responsible for a crime. The threshold model is therefore more likely to inefﬁciently allocate punishment resources at sentencing than it is at trial.111
3. Problems with the Deterrence-Based Inefficiency Critique

The deterrence-based inefﬁciency argument is instructive, but it also suffers
from two important problems.
First, effective deterrence requires that the justice system send a warning
about future punishments strong enough to dissuade future wrongdoers
from committing crimes. That warning will only deter a potential wrongdoer if the expected severity of the punishment he will receive, discounted
by the probability that he will not get caught, exceeds his expected gains
from the crime. Reducing the severity of the punishment that the wrongdoer will receive based on the court’s judgment of the probability of his
guilt, therefore, might also reduce its deterrent effect.112 In other words,
a wrongdoer may be more willing to commit a crime if he thinks that the

111. The fact that a wrongful conviction leads to an entirely wasted prison term, while
a wrongful upward adjustment leads to a wasted increase in the length of the term, means
that on a macro scale, the threshold model of conviction may still be more inefﬁcient than
the threshold model of sentencing.
112. Put another way, punishment-as-deterrence requires the imposition of a punishment
of severity P, such that the probability of being punished, x, is greater than the expected gain
from the crime, G. Therefore, xP > G. Fisher and Lando suggest that it would be more
efﬁcient to reduce P based on the probability of the defendant’s guilt, b. According to that
approach, the calculation of an effective deterrent would become xbP > G. To maintain the
same deterrent effect, therefore, P would have to increase, which may well undo any of the
efﬁciency gains that Fisher and Lando seek.
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possible punishment he will face, if he gets caught, will be reduced in
proportion to the doubts about his guilt.
Second, as explained earlier,113 the deterrent impact of punishment
depends in part on the sending of a ‘‘substantive,’’ rather than an ‘‘evidentiary,’’ message about the convicted defendant’s conduct. Remember that
according to Professor Nesson, for a punishment to effectively deter bad
behavior, it must announce deﬁnitively that the defendant committed
a crime, thereby communicating a moral warning against bad behavior
that ‘‘inculcates the behavioral message associated with the applicable legal
rule.’’114 Scaling punishment to the probability of the defendant’s guilt,
however, would undermine this moral warning, since it would not declare
that the offender committed a crime, but merely state that the evidence
suggests with a high degree of certainty that he did so. This would change
the law’s ‘‘substantive message from one of morality (‘feel guilty if you do
wrong’) to one of crude risk calculation (‘estimate what you can do without
getting caught’).’’115 It may therefore undermine punishment’s deterrent
effect, since future offenders might not feel as obligated to respect the latter
conception of criminal justice.
4. Nondeterrence Inefficiency Critiques of the Threshold Model

Applying Fisher and Lando’s framework to nondeterrent theories of punishment resolves these two problems. In other words, although Fisher and
Lando focus solely on deterrence, ironically, their inefﬁciency critique of
the threshold model is much more persuasive from the perspective of the
retributive, incapacitative, and rehabilitative theories of punishment.
Fisher and Lando’s inefﬁciency argument is perfectly consistent with
these other theories of punishment. From a retributive perspective, for
example, incarceration is more likely to provide just punishment when it
is imposed on defendants who are more likely to have engaged in wrongdoing. From an incapacitative perspective, prison is more likely to protect
the public when it is used to conﬁne defendants who are more likely to pose
a public safety threat. Finally, from a rehabilitative perspective, penal resources are more likely to provide needed socialization and training when
113. See supra, Part III.B.
114. Nesson, supra note 10, at 1362–64.
115. Id. at 1362.
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they are expended on defendants who are more likely to be in need of
rehabilitation. The converse is of course also true in all cases: punishments
are more likely to be wasted when they are imposed on offenders whose
guilt is less probable. From each of these perspectives, therefore, it is
inefﬁcient to punish offenders equally when the probability of their culpability is unequal.
Moreover, these nondeterrent theories of punishment do not depend on
communicating a stern or substantive warning to future offenders. As
a result, a probabilistic approach to sentencing would not undermine the
purpose of punishment from these perspectives, as it might under the
deterrent theory of punishment. The retributive, incapacitative, and rehabilitative purposes of punishment use prison to achieve certain direct ends,
rather than to send a message. Although the threshold model may bolster
the deterrent impact of punishment, therefore, under these nondeterrent
theories, punishment would not lose its effectiveness if it were varied based
on the probability of the defendant’s culpability.116 In sum, Fisher and
Lando’s inefﬁciency critique of the threshold model actually works better
when applied in concert with the retributive, incapacitative, and rehabilitative theories of punishment.
B. The Threshold Model of Decision Making is Unfair
1. The Threshold Model is Unfair to the Factually Innocent

In addition to being inefﬁcient, the threshold model of decision making is
also unfair. Begin with the threshold model of conviction. By setting the
threshold level of probability required for a guilty verdict at less than 100
percent, the criminal justice system expresses a tolerance for the occasional
wrongful conviction. Put another way, convicting on less than absolute
certainty means taking the chance that that conviction will be erroneous.
The 95 percent threshold level of probability required for conviction,
therefore, reﬂects an acceptance that as many as one out of every twenty
convicted defendants may actually be innocent.

116. The threshold model might not be considered inefﬁcient from an expressive perspective, since it projects certainty about the defendant’s guilt and thereby assists the public
in ‘‘forg[ing] a link between severity of punishment and the force of the moral repudiation
of the offense and the offender.’’ Fisher, supra note 10, at 864.
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Of course, because absolute certainty is unobtainable in the courtroom,117 it is a practical necessity for the criminal justice system to tolerate
the possibility of an occasional wrongful conviction.118 What is not necessary, however, is that the threshold model denies to convicted defendants
the beneﬁt of any lingering doubts about their guilt. In other words, the
system could reduce the suffering of defendants erroneously sent to prison
by punishing less when the defendants were less likely to be guilty.119
Instead, the threshold model of conviction subjects all convicted defendants to the same exact punishment, whether they are 95 or 99 percent
certain to be guilty.120 It therefore allows a rare but signiﬁcant degree of
suffering on the part of the wrongly convicted.
The capital sentencing doctrine of ‘‘residual doubt’’ reﬂects precisely this
concern. The doctrine permits defendants convicted of a capital offense to
raise ‘‘residual doubts’’ about their guilt as a mitigating factor in the penalty
phase of the proceedings.121 ‘‘‘Residual doubt’ is . . . a lingering uncertainty
about facts, a state of mind that exists somewhere between ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ and ‘absolute certainty.’’’122 In other words, even if the
defendant is more than 95 percent likely to have committed a capital crime,
he may still seek to avoid the death penalty by pointing out the remaining
5 percent chance that he is innocent. The residual doubt doctrine suggests
that the state should kill only when it is absolutely certain that a defendant
is guilty, not merely when it has ruled out all reasonable doubts about his
guilt.123 To avoid the gross injustice of executing an innocent person, not
all convicted capital offenders should be treated alike; those that are less
likely to be guilty should not be sentenced to death. Although the doctrine
117. See B ENTHAM , supra note 5, at 351.
118. See Cahill, supra note 99, at 36.
119. Indeed, this principal has been endorsed by no less a moral authority than Atticus
Finch: ‘‘There’s always a doubt, sometimes only the shadow of a doubt. The law says
‘reasonable doubt,’ but I think a defendant’s entitled to the shadow of a doubt. There’s
always the possibility, no matter how improbable, that he’s innocent.’’ H ARPER L EE , T O
K ILL A M OCKINGBIRD 242 (1988).
120. Lando, supra note 97, at 277.
121. Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 188 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
122. Id.; see also Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 181 (1986); Christina S. Pignatelli,
Residual Doubt: It’s a Life Saver, 13 C AP . D EF . J. 307 (2001).
123. As the Supreme Court has not required jurisdictions to adopt this doctrine, it
evidentially does not consider this unfairness to be of constitutional concern. See Franklin,
487 U.S. at 172–74.

245

246 |

NEW CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | VOL. 18 | NO. 2 | SPRING 2015

is unique to capital punishment, the same principle could easily be
extended to incarceration. To reduce the injustice of imprisoning an
innocent man, not all convicted noncapital offenders should be treated
alike. Those that are less likely to be guilty should receive shorter sentences. The threshold model of conviction violates this principal of fairness by condemning offenders equally without regard to the likelihood of
their guilt.
The threshold model of sentencing is unfair in the same way. Like the
threshold model of conviction, the Sentencing Guidelines set the threshold
level of probability required for a sentence enhancement at less than 100
percent. The Guidelines therefore tolerate the fact that in some cases—just
under half of those decided at 51 percent certainty—the offender will have
his prison term extended based on factual ﬁndings about him or his crime
that are not actually true.
As with the threshold model of conviction, this unfairness is probably
a necessary evil, since it would be impractical for the Guidelines to demand
absolute certainty before a court could enhance an offender’s sentence.
Nevertheless, it is not necessary for the Guidelines to deny offenders the
beneﬁt of whatever doubts remain about their culpability. The Guidelines
could mitigate the suffering of offenders whose sentences are erroneously
extended by instructing courts to increase sentences by a lesser amount
when they are less certain that the factual predicates for those increases have
been fulﬁlled. Instead, like the threshold model of conviction, the threshold model of sentencing applies all sentence enhancements equally, regardless of whether the factual predicate for those enhancements is 51 or 100
percent likely to be true. The Guidelines therefore accept that some offenders will serve longer prison terms than they deserve, and yet they do
not attempt to reduce those terms for offenders whose culpability is in
doubt.
2. The Threshold Model is More Unfair at Sentencing than at Trial

Because the two stages of the proceedings place different burdens of proof
on the government, the penalty stage inﬂicts far more unfairness on innocent offenders than does the guilt sage. The standard of proof used at trial is
so high that it likely mitigates the unfairness of the threshold model of
conviction. According to Professor Larry Tribe, the beyond-a-reasonabledoubt standard does not imply an acceptance of occasional erroneous
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convictions. To the contrary, it reﬂects a ‘‘refus[al] to take a deliberate risk
of punishing any innocent man.’’124
Professor Tribe argues that it would be a mistake to infer that the
criminal justice system tolerates the conviction of innocent defendants in
5 percent of cases simply because the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard
is commonly equated with 95 percent certainty.125 Focusing too hard on
these numbers misses the entire point of that burden of proof, in which the
‘‘fundamental postulate’’ is ‘‘that deliberately . . . punish[ing] a man of
whose guilt we feel unsure is wrong.’’126 In other words, Tribe rejects the
quantiﬁcation of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard as 95 percent
probability of guilt. Instead, he says that the criminal justice system uses
that standard to credit accused defendants with any reasonable doubts
about their guilt, setting them free if they can make any plausible argument
that they did not commit the crime charged. The beyond-a-reasonabledoubt standard, therefore, is not ‘‘a mere probabilistic device to assure
a sufﬁciently low frequency of erroneous convictions.’’127 Although Tribe
accepts that absolute certainty is impossible, he asserts that the beyond-areasonable-doubt standard of proof attempts to prevent any erroneous
conviction by ‘‘com[ing] as close to certainty as human knowledge allows.’’128 It is a ‘‘basic security conferred by a system that promises never
to punish in the face of real doubt.’’129 In short, according to Tribe’s
analysis, the threshold model of conviction uses the fairest, most favorable
standard of proof that could possibly be applied in order to protect innocent defendants.
Unfortunately, however, the threshold model of sentencing uses a much
lower preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, and so it cannot be defended
under Professor Tribe’s analysis. Far from a ‘‘basic security’’ against wrongful
punishment,130 the preponderance standard reﬂects the criminal justice
124. Tribe, supra note 14, at 388.
125. See id. at 385–86.
126. Id. at 386.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 388. Tribe’s perspective suggests that, since there is no conceivable epistemic
space above proof ‘‘beyond a reasonable doubt,’’ the ‘‘residual doubt’’ doctrine, see Franklin
v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 188 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring), is a ﬁgment of the legal
imagination.
129. Tribe, supra note 14, at 386.
130. Id.
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system’s ‘‘minimal concern’’131 with the decision whether to increase an
offender’s sentence. Courts have offered several justiﬁcations for using this
lower standard of proof at sentencing,132 but the fact remains that proof by
a preponderance of the evidence clearly reﬂects the acceptance of ‘‘a deliberate risk’’133 that in just under half of all cases, offenders may spend more
time in prison than they deserve.
Because of this lower standard of proof, the unfairness of the threshold
model will manifest with far greater frequency at sentencing than it will at
trial. At worst, one of every twenty criminal trials will result in a false
conviction. But under the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard,
approximately one of every two defendants may have their sentences
enhanced based on culpable conduct that they never actually committed.
Remember, as well, that errors are more common at sentencing due to the
disjunctive nature of sentence enhancements.134 As a result, the rate at
which offenders are erroneously punished (and then denied the beneﬁt of
any doubts about their culpability) is almost certain to be higher at sentencing than it is at trial.
Of course, errors at trial, when they do occur, may still be more unfair
than those at sentencing, since the consequences of a wrongful conviction (a
prison term) are much more severe than for an wrongful sentence enhancement (a somewhat longer prison term). Nevertheless, especially for larger
sentence enhancements, an erroneous increase to an offender’s punishment
can do signiﬁcant harm. Recall, for example, that the recommended sentence
for the crime of ‘‘possessing dangerous materials on an aircraft’’ is sextupled if
the judge believes that there was a 51 percent chance that the offender did so
‘‘willfully and without regard for the safety of human life.’’135 If a court
misjudges and erroneously applies that 15-level enhancement—as it will in
just under half of all cases decided at the minimum required level of certainty—it will be committing a serious injustice.
The federal courts have recognized that the lower standard of proof at
sentencing creates the potential for greater injustice. In McMillan v. Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court warned that the Due Process Clause and the

131. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979).
132. See Young, supra note 32, at 335–36.
133. Tribe, supra note 14, at 388.
134. See supra, Part IV.A.2.
135. U.S.S.G. § 2K1.5(a) & (b)(1).
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Sixth Amendment forbade states from ‘‘evad[ing]’’ the beyond-areasonable-doubt standard mandated at trial by ‘‘restructuring existing
crimes’’ to make certain sentencing factors exceptionally punitive, such
that they would become ‘‘a tail which wags the dog of the substantive
offense.’’136 In other words, a state may not take advantage of the lower
standard of proof at sentencing by creating an excessively punitive sentence
enhancement, which would allow the prosecution to convict a defendant
on more innocuous conduct at trial and then wait until sentencing to bring
up his truly culpable behavior. This principal was applied most famously by
the Third Circuit in United States v. Kikumura, where the panel held that
facts that would increase the defendant’s offense level by 22 levels had to be
found by clear and convincing evidence, rather than by a mere preponderance of the evidence.137 According to the Kikumura court, ‘‘the potential
for signiﬁcant unfairness’’ becomes too great ‘‘[i]n this extreme context,’’
where the offender’s sentence increased ‘‘twelve-fold’’ based only on a 51
percent probable fact-ﬁnding.138 Although that holding was later reversed
en banc, it demonstrates that federal courts are well aware of the higher risk
of error at sentencing, and that when the penal consequences become large
enough, the unfairness of an erroneous 51 percent probable fact-ﬁnding at
sentencing may attain constitutional dimensions.

V. THE THRESHOLD MODEL OF DRUG QUANTITY
DETERMINATION

This Part will argue that the threshold model of sentencing is particularly
problematic when it comes to determinations of drug quantity. Under the
Sentencing Guidelines, drug quantity helps determine the offense level for
crimes involving the unlawful manufacturing, importing, exporting, or
trafﬁcking of a controlled substance (as well as possession with intent to
commit any of those crimes).139 Like other facts at sentencing, drug
136. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 87–89 (1986).
137. See United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1101–2 (3d Cir. 1990), overruled by,
United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).
138. Id. at 1099–101.
139. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. Calculating the total offense level for other drug-related
offenses may also require drug quantity determinations; for example, use of a communication facility in committing a drug offense, see U.S.S.G. § 2D1.6, and narco-terrorism, see
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quantity is found by a judge using a preponderance-of-the-evidence threshold standard of proof. Three unique features of drug quantity determinations, however, make these fact-ﬁndings especially vulnerable to the ﬂaws
of the threshold model of sentencing. First, because drug quantity determinations are made at each sentencing for a drug-trafﬁcking offense, they
are particularly common, and thus they are more frequently responsible for
wasting resources and unfairly extending prison sentences. Second, drug
quantity determinations can produce unusually large increases to the offender’s sentence, which gives them the potential to create the most inefﬁciency and unfairness at sentencing. Finally, judges often must estimate
drug quantities, and these estimations are notoriously unreliable. As
a result, drug quantity determinations are more likely than other factﬁndings to erroneously extend a sentence, thereby wasting punishment
resources and unfairly punishing less culpable offenders.
A. Drug Quantity Determinations are Particularly Common

Because drug quantity determines the base offense level for a drugtrafﬁcking offense, these fact-ﬁndings are particularly common. As a result,
they are responsible for a large proportion of the inefﬁciencies and injustices at sentencing.
For most crimes, the Guidelines assign a speciﬁc base offense level that
the court can then adjust upward or downward based on the particular
conduct of the offender. The base offense level for ﬁrst degree murder, for
example, is 43.140
For drug crimes, by contrast, the Guidelines provide that the base
offense level depends on the total quantity of drugs involved in the
offense.141 The Guidelines do not provide a set base offense level for
a drug-trafﬁcking crime. Instead, they instruct the court to determine the
quantity of drugs involved in the offense, and then to use the Drug Quantity Table to convert that quantity into a base offense level.142 So, for
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.14. By contrast, the offense level for mere possession of a controlled substance does not depend on the quantity of drugs involved. See U.S.S.G. § 2D2.1.
140. See U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1.
141. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5) & (c). There is an exception if death or serious bodily
injury resulted from the use of the offender’s drugs, in which case the Guidelines do prescribe a speciﬁc base offense level. See § 2D1.1(a)(1)–(4).
142. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5).
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instance, if the court ﬁnds that one kilogram of marijuana was involved in
a crime, the base offense level would be 10, but if the court ﬁnds that ﬁve
kilograms of marijuana were involved, the base offense level would be
14.143 After the base level has been decided, the court may then adjust that
level by adding or subtracting other offense-speciﬁc and general sentence
adjustments, as it would for any other crime.
Sentences for drug-trafﬁcking crimes are therefore ‘‘largely quantitydriven.’’144 Sentence enhancements typically apply only sporadically; they
are only relevant if the speciﬁc criminal conduct in question calls for them.
So, for example, the enhancement for committing a hate crime will only
come into play if the prosecution alleges at sentencing that the crime was
motivated by racial animus.145 But because drug quantity controls the base
offense level for a drug-trafﬁcking crime, it must be determined at each and
every sentencing hearing for each and every drug-trafﬁcking case.146
Keep in mind, as well, that drug offenses account for nearly one-third of
all sentencings in the federal court system, which makes them the second
most commonly sentenced offense, just barely behind immigration offenses.147 So, of all the punishment resources wasted and offenders wrongly
incarcerated under the threshold model of sentencing, a large proportion
can be traced back to drug offense sentencings, and of those, a large proportion can be traced even further back to the calculations of drug quantities made at those sentencings. To reduce the inefﬁciency and unfairness
of the Sentencing Guidelines on a national scale, therefore, it would make
sense to begin by reforming drug quantity determinations.
143. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c).
144. United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1196 (1st Cir. 1993); see also United States v.
Rivera-Maldonado, 194 F.3d 224, 228 (1st Cir. 1999).
145. See U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(a).
146. Of course, in many cases the offender will have pled guilty to a speciﬁc amount of
contraband, which means the court will not need to independently calculate a quantity.
However, not every plea includes an agreement on quantity. Moreover, plea negotiations
take place in the shadow of the rules for sentencing, and so those rules still have an impact
even in cases where the court does not itself perform the drug quantity determination. See
Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 H ARV . L. R EV . 2463,
2486–91 (2004).
147. U.S. Sentencing Commission’, 2012 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics,
Figure A: Distribution of Offenders in Each Primary Offense Category, United States
Sentencing Commission, http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_
and_Sourcebooks/2012/FigureA.pdf.
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B. Drug Quantity Determinations are Particularly Consequential

Because drug quantity determinations can produce the largest sentence
variances in the federal Guidelines, they are also particularly consequential.
Therefore, they have the potential to produce the most extreme inefﬁciencies and injustices at sentencing.
Most sentence enhancements, with some exceptions, range between one
and ten levels, even for particularly heinous conduct. For example, a kidnapper’s offense level will increase by two if he used a dangerous weapon,
by four if the victim sustained permanent or life-threatening injury, and by
six if he sexually exploited the victim.148
By contrast, a single drug quantity calculation can change an offender’s
offense level by up to 32 levels. The First Circuit has referred to this
phenomenon as the ‘‘dramatic leveraging effect’’ of drug quantity determinations.149 The Drug Quantity Table, used to convert the sentencing
judge’s drug quantity determination into a base offense level, ranges from
a minimum level of six (applied, for example, to crimes involving less
than 250 grams of marijuana) to a maximum of 38 (applied to crimes
involving more than 30,000 kilograms of the same).150 The court’s
calculation of drug quantity can therefore swing the offender across
32 offense levels, more than any other factual ﬁnding in the federal
Guidelines.
Of course, because drug quantity determines the base offense level, there
is no reference point against which to measure the size of this ‘‘enhancement.’’ But remember that the Guidelines use a ‘‘real offense’’ approach to
sentencing, which means that judges are not bound by the amount of drugs
alleged in the indictment or proved to the jury.151 As a result, an offender
may be convicted based on a single transaction involving a relatively small
quantity of drugs, but have his sentence dramatically lengthened when the
sentencing judge independently ﬁnds that a much larger quantity of drugs
was actually involved in the scheme.152
These stories are commonplace. Emilio Correa-Alicea, for example, was
convicted of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute crack cocaine
148. See U.S.S.G. § 2A4.1(b)(2)(A) & (5).
149. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1198.
150. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c).
151. See United States v. Williams, 917 F.2d 112, 114 (3d Cir. 1990) (collecting cases).
152. See United States v. Shonubi, 895 F. Supp. 460, 476 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (Weinstein, J.).
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based on two sales of approximately 40 grams of the drug.153 At sentencing, however, he was held responsible for 4.5 kilograms of crack, which
effectively raised his offense level by 10.154 Scott Jarvi was found with 22.73
grams of methamphetamine in his home and convicted of possession with
intent to distribute, but he was sentenced based on a drug quantity of
853.05 grams, effectively raising his offense level by 12.155 Levi Culps was
caught distributing one kilogram of marijuana but sentenced based on the
court’s estimation that he was responsible for selling between 80 to 100
kilograms of the drug, an effective 16-level enhancement.156 Kevin Townley was convicted of possession with intent to distribute 27 grams of
cocaine but held responsible at sentencing for an additional six kilograms,
an effective 18-level enhancement that corresponded to a tenfold increase in
his recommended sentence.157
Drug quantity determinations at sentencing, therefore, have the potential to cause some of the worst inefﬁciencies and injustices. Recall that the
threshold model is inefﬁcient because it extends offenders’ sentences without regard to the possibility that that extended sentence will be wasted. The
threshold model of sentencing will, accordingly, waste the most resources
when a drug quantity determination results in the longest extension of an
offender’s sentence. Similarly, the threshold model is unfair because it
increases offenders’ punishments equally without crediting them for the
possibility that they are innocent of the underlying culpable conduct. Once
again, the model will cause the most unfairness when a drug quantity
determination results in the largest increase in the offender’s punishment.
Reforming drug quantity determinations therefore has the potential to
mitigate the most serious inefﬁciencies and injustices that are associated
with the threshold model of sentencing.
C. Drug Quantity Determinations Are Particularly Unreliable

Because judges must often extrapolate drug quantities from a few key data
points, these fact-ﬁndings are particularly unreliable. Consequently, they
are more likely to extend offenders’ sentences erroneously, resulting in
153. See United States v. Correa-Alicea, 585 F.3d 484, 489–90 (1st Cir. 2009).
154. See id. at 490.
155. See United States v. Jarvi, 537 F.3d 1256, 1258–59 (10th Cir. 2008).
156. See United States v. Culps, 300 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 2002).
157. See United States v. Townley, 929 F.2d 365, 367–68 (8th Cir. 1991).
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wasted punishment resources and the unfair punishment of less culpable
offenders.
For most crimes, the Guidelines suggest that judges perform a relatively
narrow inquiry into the ‘‘relative conduct’’ for which the defendant is
responsible. The defendant’s total offense level depends on his behavior
‘‘during the . . . offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in
the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that
offense.’’158 District courts will therefore focus only on what happened
before, during, and after the offense.
For drug crimes, however the Guidelines instruct judges to consider
a much wider range of conduct. This broader inquiry results from several
unique rules. First, the ‘‘relevant conduct’’ inquiry is broader for drug
offenders than it is for other offenders. According to the Guidelines, drug
offenders should be sentenced based on ‘‘all acts and omissions . . . that
were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the
offense of conviction.’’159 The sentencing judge is therefore not strictly
limited to what happened before, during, and after the offense of conviction, but may also consider conduct ‘‘substantially connected [to that
offense] by at least one common factor,’’ as well as conduct ‘‘sufﬁciently
connected [to that offense] . . . as to warrant the conclusion that they are
part of a single episode, spree, or ongoing series of offenses.’’160
Second, ‘‘in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity,’’ the
Guidelines hold offenders responsible, for ‘‘all reasonably foreseeable acts
and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal
activity.’’161 Criminal conspiracies are, of course, quite common in drugtrafﬁcking cases. The Guidelines therefore speciﬁcally instruct that a drug
offender should be held responsible not only for ‘‘all quantities of contraband with which he was directly involved’’ but also for ‘‘all reasonably
foreseeable quantities of contraband that were within the scope of the
criminal activity that he jointly undertook.’’162
Finally, and perhaps more importantly, the Guidelines do not limit
judges to counting only quantities of drugs that have actually been seized.

158. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1) (emphasis added).
159. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2) (emphasis added).
160. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 n.9.
161. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(1)(B).
162. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 n.2.
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Instead, ‘‘[w]here there is no drug seizure or the amount seized does not
reﬂect the scale of the offense,’’ the Guidelines provide that the court
should ‘‘approximate the quantity of the controlled substance.’’163 As
a result of these three rules, judges must perform a much broader inquiry
into the quantity of drugs for which an offender is responsible than they do
for most other fact-ﬁndings at sentencing.
Because ‘‘judges are forced to try to estimate the total quantity of drugs
handled’’ by the offender and his co-conspirators, they must often resort to
evidence that ‘‘differs greatly in both characteristic and quality.’’164 This
evidence may include inferences, extrapolations, and less-than-credible witness testimony.165 Speciﬁcally, the Guidelines suggest that ‘‘the court may
consider . . . the price generally obtained for the controlled substance, ﬁnancial or other records, similar transactions in controlled substances by the
defendant, and the size or capability of any laboratory involved.’’166 Though
these calculations are practically routine in drug-trafﬁcking cases,167 they
‘‘can be more accurately characterized as educated guesses.’’168
Take the relatively common scenario in which a defendant is caught with
only a small amount of drugs but a large amount of cash. In that case, if the
court ﬁnds that the money represents the proceeds from drug sales, it may
convert the cash into an estimated total quantity of contraband sold based
on a presumed price per unit.169 Or, if a defendant is caught manufacturing
drugs in a laboratory, the court may use the labels of leftover empty bottles
to calculate the total drug quantity that he likely produced.170 Even more

163. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 n.5
164. Johan Bring & Colin Aitken, Burden of Proof and Estimation of Drug Quantities
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 18 C ARDOZO L. R EV . 1987, 1987, 1990 (1997).
165. See United States v. Shonubi, 895 F. Supp. 460, 476 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (Weinstein, J.);
see also United States v. Uwaeme, 975 F.2d 1016, 1019 (4th Cir. 1992).
166. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, cmt. n. 5.
167. See United States v. Marquez, 699 F.3d 556, 561 (1st Cir. 2012); see also United States
v. Rios, 22 F.3d 1024, 1028 (10th Cir.1994); United States v. Colon, 961 F.2d 41, 43 (2d Cir.
1992); Shonubi, 895 F. Supp. at 475–78 (collecting cases).
168. Bring & Aitken, supra note 164, at 1987.
169. See, e.g., United States v. Keszthelyi, 308 F.3d 557, 577 (2002); Rios, 22 F.3d at 1028; see
also United States v. Ortiz-Martinez, 1 F.3d 662, 675 (8th Cir.1993); United States v. Duarte,
950 F.2d 1255, 1265 (7th Cir.1991); United States v. Jackson, 3 F.3d 506, 511 (1st Cir.1993).
170. See, e.g., United States v. Macklin, 927 F.2d 1272, 1282 (2d Cir. 1991); United States
v. Smallwood, 920 F.2d 1231, 1236–37 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Evans, 891 F.2d 686,
687–88 (8th Cir.1989).
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inferential is the ‘‘multiplier method’’ of drug quantity calculation,
endorsed by several courts of appeal, used in cases where the evidence
suggests that the defendant sold a certain quantity of drugs at a certain
frequency over a certain period of time.171 In that scenario, the district
court may estimate a total drug quantity by ‘‘determining a daily or weekly
quantity, selecting a time period over which it is more likely than not that
the defendant was dealing in that quantity[,] and multiplying these two
factors together.’’172
When drug quantities are calculated based on a few key data points, they
are particularly vulnerable to error.173 For instance, the court might misjudge the street price of the drug when converting cash to drug weight or
overestimate the capacity of a drug-manufacturing defendant’s laboratory.174 Alternatively, the court might receive bad evidence on the number
of drug sales a trafﬁcker typically made, or the quantity of drugs sold in
each transaction.175 In each of these cases, a minor mistake would be
multiplied into an enormous miscalculation—a phenomenon described
as the ‘‘pyramiding [of] unreliable inferences.’’176 Accordingly, even when
they satisfy the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of proof, drug
quantity estimates based on inference and extrapolation will ‘‘inherently
possess a degree of uncertainty.’’177
Courts of appeal have therefore repeatedly reversed drug quantity determinations that are overly reliant on extrapolations,178 although plenty of
others have been afﬁrmed.179 As compared to fact-ﬁndings based on hard

171. See United States v. Culps, 300 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 2002); see also United
States v. Paulino, 996 F.2d 1541, 1548 (3d Cir.1993); Colon, 961 F.2d at 43; Shonubi, 895 F.
Supp. at 477–78 (collecting cases).
172. Culps, 300 F.3d at 1077.
173. See United States v. Rivera-Maldonado, 194 F.3d 224, 231 (1st Cir. 1999); see also
Bring & Aitken, supra note 164, at 1997.
174. See, e.g., Shonubi, 895 F. Supp. at 476.
175. Cf. id. at 492.
176. Rivera-Maldonado, 194 F.3d at 233.
177. United States v. D’Anjou, 16 F.3d 604, 614 (4th Cir. 1994).
178. See, e.g., United States v. Shonubi, 998 F.2d 84, 89–90 (2d Cir. 1993); United States
v. Garcia, 994 F.2d 1499, 1509 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Hewitt, 942 F.2d 1270, 1274
(8th Cir. 1991).
179. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 12 F.3d 1350, 1369 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v.
McMillen, 8 F.3d 1246, 1249–51 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Sklar, 920 F.2d 107, 113 (1st
Cir. 1990).
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evidence, then, drug quantity determinations are particularly likely to
erroneously extend offenders’ sentences, wasting punishment resources
and unjustly extending prison terms. They are also particularly well suited
to reforms that would reduce the negative impact of any judicial
miscalculations.

VI. INCORPORATING PROBABILITY INTO DRUG
QUANTITY DETERMINATIONS

This Part will show that, despite all these problems, there is some good
news. Although the ﬂaws of the threshold model are particularly acute at
sentencing, and are even worse when it comes to drug quantity determinations, sentencing is also especially amenable to probabilistic reform.
Because the Sentencing Guidelines are not binding, district judges have
the discretion to select punishments at the low end of the recommended
Guidelines range, or even to vary downward from that recommendation, in
cases where the recommended Guidelines sentence is not commensurate to
the probability of the offender’s culpability. And because the law of sentencing is quite ﬂexible, policymakers in the criminal justice system—
courts of appeal, the Sentencing Commission, Congress, and even the
President—can implement reforms to mitigate the negative effects of the
threshold model of sentencing.
A. The Promise of Probabilistic Reform at Sentencing

Three features of sentencing make it a better stage than conviction to
incorporate probability into punishment. Sentencings are far more common than trials, the Sentencing Guidelines are not binding on district
courts, and the law of sentencing is much more ﬂexible than the law of
conviction.
First, it is actually quite rare for the government to convict a defendant
by proving his guilt at trial beyond a reasonable doubt. More than nine of
out ten federal criminal defendants waive their trial right and instead plead
guilty, making ‘‘[o]ur world . . . no longer one of trials, but of guilty
pleas.’’180 Even when they plead guilty, however, defendants still have
180. Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of
Guilty Pleas, 110 Y ALE L.J. 1097, 1150 (2001).
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a right to a sentencing hearing before a judge, who will calculate and impose
an appropriate punishment using the Sentencing Guidelines procedure
described earlier. Therefore, while changes to the threshold model of conviction would only impact the small percentage of defendants who go to trial,
probabilistic reforms implemented at sentencing would affect every single
convicted criminal defendant.181 Both in terms of the number of defendants
affected and the total number of years of incarceration at stake, probabilistic
reform of the law of sentencing therefore has greater potential to meaningfully impact the administration of American criminal justice.
Second, district court judges are not bound to accept the sentences
recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines. District courts must begin
their analysis by calculating a recommended sentence through the Guidelines’ threshold decision-making process.182 However, the Supreme
Court’s decision in Booker183 frees them to vary from that recommendation. As will be explained in a few moments, this ﬂexibility permits district
courts to vary from the recommended Guidelines sentence in cases where
that recommendation overestimates the probability of the offender’s overall
culpability.184 Although judges are not free to innovate when it comes to
determinations of guilt and innocence, then, they can use their discretion
under Booker to incorporate probability into sentencing outcomes.
Finally, the law of sentencing is more amenable to change. The presumption of innocence, along with the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof used at trial, are hard-coded into criminal proceedings under
the Constitution’s Due Process Clause.185 Only a constitutional amendment could change these rules, which would require action from either
two-thirds of both houses of Congress or a constitutional convention called
by the states.186 The law of sentencing, however, is far less constitutionally

181. Although guilty pleas may also include admissions to speciﬁc factual predicates
required for sentence enhancements, plea negotiations always take place in the shadow of
the rules for sentencing. Therefore, reforming those rules along probabilistic lines will still
have an impact even in cases where the court does not itself perform the relevant factﬁnding. See Bibas, supra note 146, at 2486–91.
182. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 n.6 (2007).
183. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
184. See infra, Part VI.B.
185. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508
U.S. 275, 278, (1993); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
186. See C ONST . Art. V.
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constrained; sentencing judges do not, in theory, decide guilt, and so the
Due Process Clause bears less heavily on the proceedings.187 In addition,
there are several policymakers in the criminal justice system with the power
to reform the law of sentencing. Courts of appeal, for instance, could tinker
with the standard of proof at sentencing using the Due Process Clause.188
The United States Sentencing Commission could change the Sentencing
Guidelines that take better account of probability, and Congress could do
the same by amending the Sentencing Reform Act. The President and
Attorney General, too, could play a role, by considering the probability
of the various factual predicates at issue when they decide which sentencing
enhancements to seek.189 The incorporation of probability into sentencing
is therefore a policy reform within the power of several different actors.
B. Using District Court Discretion to Take Account of Probability
1. Doctrinal Justifications for Discretionary Probabilistic Sentencing

In each individual case, district court judges can use their sentencing
discretion to take better account of probability when punishing criminal
defendants. By sentencing less severely when the probability of the offender’s culpability is lower, district courts will mitigate the inefﬁciency and
unfairness of the threshold model of sentencing. Given the manifold problems with the threshold model of drug quantity determination,190 district
courts should especially consider exercising their discretion to vary downward from the Guidelines recommendation when they sentence drug
offenders.

187. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246–52 (1949); see also McMillan v.
Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91 (1986); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984); United
States v. McDowell, 888 F.2d 285, 290–91 (3d Cir. 1989).
188. See, e.g., United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990), overruled by
United States v. Grier, 449 F.3d 558 (2006); see also United States v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d 654,
663–64 (9th Cir. 1991) (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
189. The Obama Administration recently took similar action to implement reforms of
the federal mandatory minimum sentencing regime. See Douglas A. Berman, Some
Sentencing-Related Highlights from AG Holder’s Remarks Today to the ABA, S ENTENCING
L A W A N D P O L I C Y B L O G (Aug. 12, 2013, 6:43 PM), http://sentencing.typepad.com/
sentencing_law_and_policy/2013/08/some-sentencing-related-highlights-from-ag-holdersremarks-today-to-the-aba.html.
190. See supra Part IV.
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First, sentencing judges can simply select sentences at the low end of the
recommended Guidelines range. Remember that the end result of the
Guidelines calculation is not a speciﬁc sentence, but a range of months;
for instance, a criminal history category of II and an offense level of 20
yields a recommended sentence of 37 to 46 months.191 Therefore, even if
a district court judge wants to stick with the Guidelines recommendation,
she can still choose the lowest recommended sentence in a case where the
recommendation overestimates the strength of the government’s case.
Although this will not have a major impact on the efﬁciency or fairness
of the threshold model of sentencing, it will still reﬂect a small measure of
progress.
Second, and more signiﬁcantly, district court judges have the discretion
to vary downward from the recommended Guidelines sentence if it is not
justiﬁed by the weight of the evidence against the offender. Under the
indeterminate sentencing regime that preceded the Sentencing Guidelines,
courts could ‘‘ameliorate any adverse impact on defendants from unreliable
fact-ﬁnding’’ by using their unbridled discretion to give lighter sentences in
cases where the evidence of culpability was less persuasive.192 Under the
current system, judges should remember that despite the threshold nature
of the Sentencing Guidelines, they still retain the power to vary from those
Guidelines if the strength of the evidence against the offender does not
support the recommended sentence.
The Second Circuit suggested a doctrinal foundation for this exercise of
discretion in United States v. Gigante.193 There, two senior members of the
Genovese and Colombo crime organizations had been convicted of extortion and assigned base offense levels of 18, which would have resulted in
recommended sentences of 27 to 33 months.194 At sentencing, however, the
district court applied several sentence enhancements related to the defendants’ roles in the offense, the amount of money they extorted, and their
attempts to obstruct justice.195 All told, these upward adjustments raised
the defendants’ total offense levels to 34 and 35, and the district judge
ultimately sentenced them to prison terms of 188 months and 200 months,
191. See U.S.S.G. Sentencing Table.
192. Young, supra note 32, at 305–6; see also id. at 330.
193. Gigante, 94 F.3d 53 (1996).
194. See United States v. Gigante, 39 F.3d 42, 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1994), vacated and
superseded in part on denial of rehearing by United States v. Gigante, 94 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 1996).
195. See id.
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respectively.196 The defendants appealed, arguing that upward adjustments
this substantial could not be premised on facts found by a mere preponderance of the evidence without violating the Constitution’s Due Process
Clause.197
The Second Circuit rejected that argument, reafﬁrming that the preponderance standard applied at sentencing.198 But the court also suggested
a way that district courts could use their sentencing discretion to mitigate
‘‘the danger of factual error [that] would permeate a substantial upward
departure . . . proven only by a bare preponderance.’’199 The panel’s logic
proceeded as follows: A district court has the discretion to vary from
a recommended Guidelines sentence if it ﬁnds that in the case before it
‘‘there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to
a degree, not adequately taken into considering by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the [G]uidelines.’’200 The ‘‘risk of factual error’’
when applying an especially large sentence enhancement at a relatively low
level of conﬁdence (though still above 50%) ‘‘is a circumstance present at
least ‘to a degree’ not adequately considered by the Commission.’’201 In
other words, because the Sentencing Commission has not yet taken into
account the problems of the threshold model of sentencing, district courts
have the power to vary downward from Guidelines’ recommendations on
this basis.
Indeed, the Gigante court did not merely recognize this as a permissible
exercise of discretion; it speciﬁcally advised district courts to do so:
In our view, the preponderance standard is no more than a threshold basis for
adjustments and departures, and the weight of the evidence, at some point
along a continuum of sentence severity, should be considered with regard to
both upward adjustments and upward departures. With regard to upward
adjustments, a sentencing judge should require that the weight of the factual
record justify a sentence within the adjusted Guidelines range. . . . Where
a higher standard [of proof], appropriate to a substantially enhanced sentence range, is not met, the court should depart downwardly.202
196. See id.
197. See id. at 46–47.
198. See Gigante, 94 F.3d 53, 56.
199. Id.
200. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1); see also U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0(2) & (3).
201. Gigante, 94 F.3d at 56.
202. Id. (emphasis in original).
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The court further held that circuit courts ‘‘should take the weight of the
evidence into account’’ when reviewing sentence enhancements on
appeal.203 Upward departures are reviewed for reasonableness, the Gigante
court explained, and ‘‘[t]he reasonableness of substantial upward departures
will depend in part on the standard of proof by which the conduct warranting the departure is established.’’204
2. An Example of Probabilistic Sentencing in a Drug Quantity Case

The case of United States v. Mills205 offers a perfect example of a drug
quantity determination that could have merited a downward variance for
uncertainty. Mr. Mills was caught crossing the border from Canada with
8.5 grams of oxycodone hidden inside his rectum.206 He was convicted of
unlawfully importing a controlled substance into the United States.207 At
Mills’ sentencing hearing, however, the prosecution alleged that he was
responsible for trafﬁcking much more than 8.5 grams of contraband.
The prosecution presented evidence showing that over the course of
several months before his arrest, Mills had exchanged $369,203 of American
currency in Canada and had crossed the border from Canada into Maine
over 200 times.208 The prosecution also presented testimony from several
conﬁdential informants alleging that Mills had been smuggling drugs from
Canada into the United States and then exchanging the proceeds for
Canadian dollars upon his return, with which he bought more product.209
According to the prosecution, Mills’ money exchanges and border crossings
represented additional instances of drug smuggling, which ‘‘were part of the
same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as [Mills’] offense of
conviction.’’210 The prosecution therefore asked the district court to hold
Mills for an additional $369,203 worth of oxycodone, which at $100 per
gram, would be equivalent to 295.4 grams of the drug—a ﬁgure 35 times
greater than the quantity with which he was actually caught.211
203. See id. at 57.
204. Id.
205. Mills, 710 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 2013).
206. See id. at 7.
207. See id. at 8; see also 21 U.S.C. 952(a).
208. See Mills, 710 F.3d at 8.
209. See id. at 9.
210. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2).
211. See Mills, 710 F.3d at 8.
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Mills denied that he had ever brought drugs into the United States other
than that one unlucky time that he had been caught. He also explained that
he crossed the border daily in order to visit his longtime girlfriend in
Canada, and that he had been exchanging American cash in Canada on
behalf of a different drug dealer in return for free drugs for his own personal
use, a story substantiated by a recorded jailhouse conversation.212 Mills
asked the court to sentence him based only on the 8.5 grams of oxycodone
with which he was caught.213
Weighing these arguments, it seems clear that the government has the
better of the case. Conﬁdential informants corroborated the physical evidence against Mills, and Mills’ story seems far-fetched. Still, Mills offered
a plausible explanation for the border crossings, and conﬁdential informants do sometimes misinform the police. Mills also presented extrinsic
evidence to support his narrative about the money exchanges. His is not the
more persuasive story, but it is certainly conceivable, and it would likely
have been sufﬁcient to raise reasonable doubts about the government’s
argument if presented at trial. If the sentencing court had been asked to
attach probabilities to each side’s version of the events, it might have
concluded that the government’s story was 75 percent likely to be true and
that Mills’ was 25 percent likely.214 Or, if enumerating a precise probability
for each side of the story would be too difﬁcult, the court might have relied
on existing standards of proof—perhaps the government had proved its
case by a preponderance of the evidence, but not by clear and convincing
evidence.
The threshold model of sentencing, however, asked the district court to
answer only a single, simple question: Was it more than 50 percent likely
that Mills’ cash exchanges and border-crossings represented instances of
drug-trafﬁcking? After considering the arguments, the court sided with the
government. It concluded that the $369,203 reﬂected Mills’ proceeds from
selling oxycodone at approximately $140 per gram, and dividing the money
accordingly, found that Mills was responsible for trafﬁcking 210.97 grams
212. See id. at 9.
213. See id.
214. Even with these odds, moreover, the government might still have been wrong about
some of the details of its case. The street price of oxycodone, for instance, might well be
higher than $100, as Mills argued, see id. at 13, which would decrease the total quantity of
drugs that the $369,203 in drug proﬁts represented. Or, perhaps Mills only earned some of
that cash by selling oxycodone.
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of the drug.215 Between the 8.5 grams of oxycodone and the 210.97 grams,
Mill’s offense level increased by 12 and his recommended sentence more
than tripled, from roughly three years in prison to over 10.216 Because Mills
also received a three-level offense level decrease for accepting responsibility
for his crime, the court ultimately sentenced him to 9 years in prison.217
If the district court had wanted to take a more probabilistic approach to
Mills’ punishment, it could begin by sentencing him at the low end of the
recommended sentencing range. This would reﬂect the court’s judgment
that Mills was more than 50 percent likely to have smuggled 295.4 grams of
oxycodone, but that he had also offered a plausible counter-narrative. The
impact would be rather minor; the difference in prison time at issue,
not counting the three-level downward adjustment for acceptance of
responsibility, would mean that Mills would receive a 121-month rather
than 151-month prison sentence (the low and high ends of the recommended sentencing range, respectively). This technique would thus spare
Mills a small, though meaningful, degree of punishment.
To take more substantial account of probability, the district court would
have to break from the Sentencing Commission and vary downward from
the recommended Guidelines sentence. Following the approach in Gigante, the judge would conclude that the dramatic increase in Mills’ recommended sentence was not warranted in light of the relatively low
probability that the prosecution’s drug quantity argument was correct. The
combination of a large offense level increase and a low level of conﬁdence in
the predicate fact is a mitigating circumstance ‘‘not adequately taken into
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the [G]uidelines,’’ and so it would justify a downward variance from the Commission’s
recommendation.218 The court therefore could give Mills a sentence

215. See id. at 13.
216. As the Mills court explained, the Sentencing Guidelines use a formula to convert
various drugs into units of marijuana in order to calculate a recommended sentence. See id.
at 9 (citing U.S.S.G. 2D1.1 cmt. N.8(D)). 1 gram of oxycodone is equivalent to 6,700 grams
of marijuana, so 8.5 grams oxycodone equals 56.95 kilograms of marijuana, and 210.97 grams
equals 1413.499 kilograms. See U.S.S.G. 2D1.1 cmt. N.8(D). The Sentencing Guidelines
assign a base offense level of 20 for drug crimes involving between 40 and 60 kilograms of
marijuana, and an offense level of 32 for crimes involving between 1,000 and 3,000 kilograms. See U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(c); see also U.S.S.G. Sentencing Table.
217. See Mills, 710 F.3d at 13.
218. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1); see also U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0(2) & (3).
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signiﬁcantly below the one recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines, in
order to account for the low probability of the fact-ﬁnding that yielded
such a high recommendation. This approach would save the federal government’s penal resources, and also a meaningful portion of Mills’ life
outside bars, based on the not insigniﬁcant chance that the court’s drug
quantity determination was wrong.
To generalize, after a district court judge calculates the Guidelines sentence for a drug offender, she should make sure to reﬂect on her level of
conﬁdence in the drug quantity that she has attributed to that defendant.
This is especially important when the quantity determination has signiﬁcantly increased the defendant’s total offense level. The judge need not
compute a precise percentage level of conﬁdence, since she can also rely on
the existing standards of proof—proof by a preponderance of the evidence,
proof by clear and convincing evidence, proof beyond a reasonable
doubt—to guide her judgment. If, in the end, the judge is not totally
conﬁdent in her quantity determination, she should, ﬁrst, remember that
she has the discretion to select a sentence on the low end of the recommended Guidelines range. Second, she should consider that her low level of
conﬁdence in the quantity determination, combined with the size of the
resulting offense level increase, may result in an unacceptable risk of error
that is a ‘‘mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately
taken into considering by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the
[G]uidelines.’’219 Therefore, if the district court judge believes that her
level of conﬁdence in her quantity determination is out of proportion to
its corresponding effect on the defendant’s offense level, she should feel free
to vary downward from the recommended Guidelines sentence. By exercising this power, district judges can begin immediately to take better
account of probability at sentencing.
C. Policy Reforms that Take Account of Probability

On a more systemic level, policymakers can reform the law of sentencing to
incorporate probability into criminal punishment. The rules for drug quantity determinations, in particular, call out for change. A few courts and
commentators have already hinted at possible approaches to this problem.
Each approach, however, comes with its own drawbacks, and all will
219. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1); see also U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0(2) & (3).
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require clearer parameters to ensure that they are applied with precision
and consistency.
1. Raising the Standard of Proof for Drug Quantity Determinations

First, the standard of proof at sentencing could be raised for drug quantity
determinations. Several circuit courts have effectively done so, although
they describe it as ‘‘err[ing] on the side of caution’’ in the calculation of
drug quantity.220 In practice, ‘‘erring on the side of caution’’ is equivalent
to raising the burden of proof for drug quantity, since when a district court
favors lower quantity estimations, it effectively requires the prosecution to
provide a higher quantum of evidence to prove a higher quantity of drugs.
Courts that have suggested this approach have expressly linked it to the
dramatic consequences of drug quantity determinations221 and to Due
Process concerns.222 Alternatively, a few appellate courts have suggested
more targeted approaches to adjusting the burden of proof in drug quantity
calculations, by raising it only when the court is relying on uncertain
witness testimony223 or when the court is considering the offender’s ‘‘relevant conduct’’ rather than the offense of conviction.224
To avoid sentencing disparities between judges who might adopt different understandings of the rather vague instruction to ‘‘err on the side of
caution,’’ courts of appeal would have to abandon euphemism and clearly
instruct district courts to raise the standard of proof for drug quantity
determinations by a speciﬁc, higher quantum—for instance, clear and
convincing evidence or proof beyond a reasonable doubt.225 Of course,
applying a higher standard of proof would not change the ‘‘threshold’’
nature of these decisions, but it would mitigate their inefﬁciency and
unfairness. A raised standard of proof would reduce the frequency at which
220. United States v. Walton, 908 F.2d 1289, 1302 (6th Cir. 1990); see also United States
v. Culps, 300 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Mahaffey, 53 F.3d 128, 131–32
(6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1198 (1st Cir. 1993). But see United
States v. Kiulin, 360 F.3d 456, 461 (4th Cir. 2004).
221. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1198.
222. United States v. Zimmer, 14 F.3d 286, 290 (6th Cir. 1994).
223. See United States v. Sampson, 140 F.3d 585, 592 (4th Cir. 1998).
224. See United States v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d 654, 663–64 (9th Cir. 1991) (Pregerson, J.,
dissenting); see also Young, supra note 32, at 354.
225. The rather vague instruction that courts should ‘‘err on the side of caution’’ risks
sentencing disparities between judges who adopt different understandings of that phrase.
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sentencing courts erroneously hold defendants responsible for excessive
quantities of contraband, thus reducing the waste of punishment resources
and the incarceration of less culpable offenders.226
On the downside, a higher standard would also make it more likely that
courts would underestimate the scale of offenders’ drug-trafﬁcking operations and impose too lenient punishments.227 Still, the Guidelines provide
a number of other upward adjustments that prosecutors could use against
particularly dangerous or large-scale drug dealers,228 and there is an emerging
consensus in the United States that federal drug sentences are already overly
punitive.229 Accordingly, this could well be a trade-off worth making.
2. Deemphasizing Drug Quantity Determinations

Second, Professors Johan Bring and Colin Aitken have proposed that
sentences for drug trafﬁckers should be less reliant on the total quantity
of drugs involved in the offense.230 To implement their proposal, Bring
and Aitken suggest ‘‘a compromise between a charged-offense sentencing
and a real-offense sentencing.’’231 First, the offender’s base offense level
would be determined by the drug quantity proven to the jury at trial
beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, the sentencing judge would enhance
the base offense level by a ﬁxed number of steps ‘‘based on whether the
convict has been involved in similar [drug-dealing] activities besides those
proven at trial or not.’’232 Bring and Aitken make clear that ‘‘the exact
226. See Young, supra note 32, at 355.
227. See United States v. Walton, 908 F.2d 1289, 1302 (6th Cir. 1990).
228. See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) (‘‘If a dangerous weapon (including a ﬁrearm) was
possessed, increase by 2 levels.’’); U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(2) (‘‘If the defendant used violence,
made a credible threat to use violence, or directed the use of violence, increase by 2 levels.’’);
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(11) (‘‘If the defendant maintained a premises for the purpose of
manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance, increase by 2 levels.’’); U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1(b)(14) (‘‘If the defendant receives an adjustment under § 3B1.1 (Aggravating Role)
and . . . [t]he defendant committed the offense as part of a pattern of criminal conduct
engaged in as a livelihood[,] [i]ncrease by 2 levels.’’).
229. See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Federal Sentencing Reform: An unlikely Senatorial love
story and a Booker double-dose?, S ENTENCING L AW AND P OLICY B LOG (Oct. 23, 2013, 6:43
PM), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2013/10/federalsentencing-reform-an-unlikely-senatorial-love-story-and-a-booker-double-dose.html.
230. Bring & Aitken, supra note 164, at 1998.
231. Id.
232. Id.
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quantity [of drugs] handled in these previous occasions’’ would not be
relevant.233 In other words, the increase in the offender’s sentence would
depend ‘‘on a qualitative variable (previous drug handling or not) rather
than a quantitative (quantity previously handled).’’234 The remainder of
the sentencing process would proceed as usual.
This approach has all the advantages of raising the standard of proof for
drug quantity—since it includes that change as its ﬁrst step—and also
avoids some of its disadvantages. Large-scale drug trafﬁckers would not
be able escape punishment as easily as they might if the standard of proof
alone were raised, since sentencing courts could also enhance their sentences based on their involvement in related drug-dealing activities.
However, by delinking the offender’s punishment from the quantity of
drugs he handled, Bring and Aitken’s proposal would permit two offenders
who trafﬁcked in vastly different quantities of drugs to receive the same
sentence. Bring and Aitken acknowledge this as a problem, but they contend
that there is ‘‘not much [moral] difference between smuggling, say, three or
ten times.’’235 That notion is certainly up for debate: if drug dealing is
immoral because of the harm it causes to drug users,236 then dealing more
drugs will cause even more harm and therefore be even more immoral. But
even accepting Bing and Aitken’s argument, moral retribution is only one of
the reasons for criminal punishment. Deterrence, too, is an important consideration.237 And to deter trafﬁckers from seeking the larger proﬁts that
come from selling larger hauls of contraband, sentences do need to have
some relation to the quantity of drugs involved in the offense.
3. Incorporating Probability into Drug Quantity Determinations

Finally, probability could be directly incorporated into the Drug Quantity
Table itself, so that the length of a drug offender’s sentence would depend
on the court’s level of conﬁdence in its drug quantity calculation. There are
multiple possible ways to implement this reform. For instance, the Sentence Guidelines could provide an instruction that when judges consider
uncharged quantities of contraband, they should scale the additional
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See Terrebonne v. Butler, 848 F.2d 500, 504 (5th Cir. 1988).
237. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B).

PROBABILITY AND PUNISHMENT

|

offense levels that those drugs would add based on their degree of certainty
in the underlying quantity estimation.238 Alternatively, the Guidelines
might include a special downward adjustment for uncertainty, which
would apply in cases where the sentencing court believes that the base
offense level prescribed by the Drug Quantity Table overestimates the
strength of the government’s case.
A few district courts have already improvised a ‘‘discount’’ approach that
is roughly similar to these suggestions. In so-called multiplier cases, courts
in the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits sometimes ‘‘discount’’ their estimated drug quantity by some percentage—say, 50 percent—‘‘to account
for uncertainties and satisfy [their] duty to err on the side of caution.’’239 As
the Third Circuit explained in one such case: ‘‘The halving of [the total
drug quantity calculated through the multiplier method] . . . is . . . a reasonable calculation by the district court, erring on the side of caution, to take
into consideration ‘off’ days and days in which perhaps lesser sales
occurred.’’240 This method effectively correlates the total drug quantity
to the sentencing judge’s level of conﬁdence in the underlying facts.
The Sentencing Commission has recently voted to seek comment on ‘‘a
proposed amendment to lower by two levels the base offense levels in the
Drug Quantity Table across drug types’’ to make drug sentencing less
punitive.241 In addition to lowering the base offense levels for these crimes,
the Commission should also follow the lead of the Third, Sixth, and Ninth
Circuits and use probability to reduce drug sentences. The Commission
could do so by adopting an ofﬁcial, and clear, ‘‘discount’’ rule that would
decrease the offender’s base offense level depending on the court’s level of
conﬁdence in its drug quantity determination.
This ‘‘uncertainty discount’’ should be available in all drug-trafﬁcking
cases, not only those that use the multiplier method for estimating drug
238. According to this approach, for instance, if an offender’s base offense level was 10
according to the drug quantity proved at trial, and would be 20 according to the additional
drug quantity found by the sentencing court at 60% certainty, then the additional 10 levels
would be reduced by 40%, resulting in a ﬁnal base offense level of 16.
239. United States v. Culps, 300 F.3d 1069, 1081 (9th Cir. 2002); see also United States v.
Paulino, 996 F.2d 1541, 1548 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Walton, 908 F.2d 1289, 1302 (6th
Cir. 1990).
240. Paulino, 996 F.2d at 1548.
241. U.S. Sentencing Commission, News Release: U.S. Sentencing Commission Seeks
Comment on Potential Reduction to Drug Trafﬁcking Sentences, supra note 2, at 1.
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quantity. After all, uncertainty about the court’s drug quantity calculation
is not unique to multiplier cases.242 Furthermore, the Guidelines should
deﬁne a precise trigger for the discount, so that it will be applied consistently. For instance, the adjustment could apply in cases where the court’s
drug ﬁnding would increase the offender’s sentence by more than 8 levels as
compared to the quantity proven at trial. In such cases, the uncertainty
discount would instruct the district court to reduce the offender’s offense
level by some number depending on its level of conﬁdence in the underlying drug quantity estimation. The Commission should again ensure that
courts consistently apply these downward adjustments by keying them to
the various burdens of proof. For example, the ‘‘discount’’ adjustment
might instruct the court to reduce the offense level by 6 if it was only 50
percent sure the calculation is correct (a bare preponderance of the evidence), by 4 if it was 70 percent sure (clear and convincing evidence), by 2
if it was 95 percent sure (just over beyond-a-reasonable-doubt), and by
none if it was over 95 percent certain (approaching absolute certainty).243
This downward adjustment for uncertainty would blunt the impact of drug
quantity sentence enhancements in cases where the incriminating facts
were less likely to be true, and thereby make the drug trafﬁcking Guideline
more efﬁcient and more just.

CONCLUSION

Criminal trials use a ‘‘threshold model’’ of decision making. If the likelihood of the defendant’s guilt crosses a 95 percent threshold level of probability, then he is convicted without regard to whether the evidence against
him just barely met that threshold or vastly exceeded it. By contrast, if the
case against the defendant does not meet the threshold, then he is entirely
acquitted, even if is still very probable that he committed the crime.
The law of sentencing also uses a threshold model of decision making. If
the likelihood that a factual predicate for an enhancement to the offender’s
sentence has been fulﬁlled is more than 50 percent, then the enhancement
242. In a cash-conversion case, for example, some of the money in the offender’s
possession might have come from sources other than drug sales, or the offender might have
occasionally charged a higher-than-average price.
243. These particular numbers are merely offered for proof of concept, and are, of course,
up for debate.
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applies in full. If it is not, then the enhancement does not apply at all. The
traditional justiﬁcations for the threshold model of conviction, however, do
not apply to the threshold model of sentencing. Moreover, the threshold
model of sentencing suffers from the same two ﬂaws as the threshold model
of conviction—inefﬁciency and unfairness—and each to a greater degree.
One area of sentencing especially in need of change is the rules for drug
quantity determinations. Because these fact-ﬁndings are particularly frequent, consequential, and unreliable, they are responsible for some of the
most severe inefﬁciencies and inequities at sentencing. The criminal justice
system can begin to address these concerns if district courts exercise their
discretion to depart downward from recommended sentences that overestimate the strength of the evidence against the defendant, and if policymakers implement reforms that better incorporate probability into
sentencing outcomes.
Of course, the ﬂaws of the threshold model of sentencing are not unique
to drug quantity determinations; the inefﬁciency and unfairness of this
approach is a problem for every fact-ﬁnding made at every sentencing.
Although drug quantity presents the most pernicious problem, each time
a sentencing judge enhances an offender’s sentence without regard to actual
probability of the underlying fact-ﬁnding, she risks wasting punishment
resources and unfairly extending the offender’s time in prison. District
judges should therefore consider using the probabilistic approach to drug
sentencing outlined above244 in all cases, particularly those involving especially large sentence enhancements. Criminal justice policymakers, too,
should consider broader reforms of the kind described above245 that would
incorporate probability into the Guidelines calculations for all kinds of
offenses, not only drug-trafﬁcking ones. Ultimately, the failure to acknowledge the role of probability reﬂects a dangerous overconﬁdence that must
be chastened at the heart of all legal decision making, where present judgments about the past are treated as sacrosanct and the consequences of
human fallibility are ignored.
Hoping to encourage a more effective and humane penal system, Professor Bill Stuntz once called for a restoration of ‘‘the quality of mercy’’ to
American criminal justice.246 He asked Americans to remember that ‘‘idea
244. See supra at Part VI.B.
245. See supra at Part VI.C.
246. W ILLIAM J. S TUNTZ , T HE C OLLAPSE OF A MERICAN C RIMINAL J USTICE 311 (2011).
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that once was so well understood that it needed never be expressed, yet now
is all but forgotten: the idea that legal condemnation is a necessary but
terrible thing—to be used sparingly, not promiscuously.’’247 The threshold
model of sentencing, unfortunately, reﬂects a proudly promiscuous philosophy of criminal punishment. It presents an image of a penal system that
is incapable of error, where as soon as an offender’s culpability has been
proved in court, he is subject to the full punishment, without regard to any
uncertainty about whether the conduct actually occurred. One way to
build a more merciful model of criminal justice would be to recognize that
the system is fallible, that probability matters, and that although the image
of certainty may contribute to the esteem of the justice system, real people
in the real world still suffer because of sentencing mistakes. If the penal
system could learn to punish while also restraining itself in cases of doubt, it
would operate more effectively and at the same time accommodate its own
fallibility. Judge Learned Hand remarked, ‘‘The spirit of liberty is the spirit
which is not too sure that it is right.’’248 The American criminal justice
system should honor that spirit by recognizing the relationship between
probability and punishment.

247. Id.
248. L END M E Y OUR E ARS : G REAT S PEECHES
Saﬁre, ed. 1997).
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